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DUDLEY DO WRONG: AN ANALYSIS OF A “STOP AND
IDENTIFY” STATUTE IN HIIBEL V. SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA1
I. INTRODUCTION
Dudley Hiibel was standing outside of his vehicle when Humboldt
County Sheriff’s Deputy Lee Dove stopped behind him and demanded
identification.2 Hiibel refused to identify himself, as required by a
Nevada “stop and identify” statute, resulting in a conviction that every
reviewing court affirmed.3
A “stop and identify” statute requires an individual detained at a
traffic or Terry stop4 to identify himself, and provides penalties for a
failure to do so.5 Various appellate courts have overturned convictions
under such statutes based on constitutional challenges.6 Until now, the
United States Supreme Court has not had a case involving both a
question of reasonable suspicion for the stop and a violation of a “stop
and identify” statute which has survived a vagueness challenge.7 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada
1. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
2. See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text (discussing the facts surrounding the Hiibel
stop).
3. See infra notes 121-46 and accompanying text (reviewing the procedural history of the
Hiibel case).
4. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (describing the Terry stop).
5. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (2005) (providing that a law enforcement officer
may ask for identification, but any detention is not an arrest); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902
(2005) (stating that a person who fails to provide identification to the satisfaction of the officer may
be detained for a maximum of two hours and then arrested if a crime was committed); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-829 (2004) (authorizing a peace officer to demand identification); NEV. REV. STAT.
171.123 (2003) (allowing a detention for a maximum of sixty minutes); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
594:2 (2004) (stipulating only that the police officer may perform a stop and request identification);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (2005) (providing for a detention of two hours, which is not classified as
an arrest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (2005) (authorizing a police officer only to stop and
question a suspect).
6. See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text (tracing various courts’ decisions on “stop
and identify” statutes).
7. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 184. The Court explained that the Hiibel case was a continuation
of the analysis of “stop and identify” statutes begun by its previous decisions. Id. See infra notes
98-104 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s decision in Kolender v. Lawson).
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threatens to erode the protections of the Fourth Amendment by allowing
arrests on reasonable suspicion alone, thereby subverting the probable
cause requirement.8 Additionally, by requiring that a suspect give his
name, perhaps leading to incriminating evidence, the Court has reduced
the privileges guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.9 In all, the Hiibel
decision reduces the depth of constitutional rights that citizens
previously enjoyed.10
Part II of this note traces the development of “stop and identify”
statutes, including its origins in historical vagrancy and loitering statutes,
courts’ treatment of such laws, and the progression of the specific
Nevada statute at issue.11 Part III examines the appellate and Supreme
Court decisions in the Hiibel case.12 Part IV analyzes the Court’s
decision in Hiibel under the void for vagueness doctrine and the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, and highlights the recent enactment of a “stop
and identify” statute in Arizona.13 Finally, Part V concludes that the
Nevada “stop and identify” statute allows too great of an intrusion for
too minimal of a benefit.14
II. BACKGROUND
In Hiibel,15 the Supreme Court considered whether a conviction for
violating of a Nevada “stop and identify” statute during a traffic stop
was constitutional under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.16 A
discussion of the development of the “stop and identify” statutes17 and
8. See infra notes 172-94 and accompanying text (analyzing the Fourth Amendment
implications of the Hiibel decision).
9. See infra notes 195-210 and accompanying text (examining the Court’s rationale from
Hiibel in the context of the Fifth Amendment).
10. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Court’s
decision on individual rights).
11. See infra notes 15-111 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 111-46 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 147-233 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
15. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
16. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 182; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring due process of law).
17. See infra notes 21-66 and accompanying text (tracing the development of various versions
of “stop and identify” statutes). See also George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in
Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 849, 912-19 (1985) (discussing statutes based upon the
Uniform Arrest Act and the further need for enabling legislation); James J. Fyfe, Enforcement
Workshop: Arrests on Reasonable Suspicion, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 470, 472 (1983) (examining the
problems with allowing arrests on less than probable cause); Alan D. Hallock, Note, Stop-andIdentify Statutes After Kolender v. Lawson: Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69
IOWA L. REV. 1057, 58 (1984) (analyzing “stop and identify” statutes and proposing a constitutional
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the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of the issues involved,18
including any applicability of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,19 is
necessary to understand the Court’s rationale and ruling.20
A. Development of “Stop and Identify” Statutes
1. Precursors to Modern “Stop and Identify” Statutes
The modern “stop and identify” statutes originated in the historical
laws of vagrancy and loitering.21 The demise of many broad vagrancy
alternative); Nicholas C. Harbist, Note, Stop and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an Inadequate
Solution to an Old Problem, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 585, 585-89 (1981) (identifying the constitutional
infirmities with the then current “stop and identify” statutes and proposing a constitutional
alternative); Lois M. Keenan, Note, California Penal Code Section 647(e): A Constitutional
Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 286 (1980) (deconstructing an
identification requirement in a California statute); John Mark Sullivan, Note, “Your Papers,
Please.” - Is an Identification Requirement Constitutional?, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 254-65
(1980) (analyzing “stop and identify” statutes in the context of United States Supreme Court
decisions).
18. See infra notes 67-104 (discussing the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of an
identification requirement).
19. See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court’s application of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to “stop and identify” statutes). See also 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal
Law § 1138 (West 2005) (stating the scope and extent of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 88 (West 2005) (describing general
stop and frisk procedure); 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 91 (West 2005) (observing that anyone
making a self-incrimination claim under the Fifth Amendment must be confronted by
incrimination); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.2 (4th Ed. 2004) (outlining the aspects of a lawful traffic stop); Aaron H.
Mendelsohn, Supreme Court Review: The Fourth Amendment and Traffic Stops: Bright-Line Rules
in Conjunction with the Totality of the Circumstances Test, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 930,
934-40 (1998) (examining the Fourth Amendment in the context of traffic stops); Genevieve
McManus, Note, State v. Matison: Validity of Traffic Stop and Standing Under Fourth Amendment
Seizure Analysis, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 56, 59-61 (1995) (discussing the constitutionality of a traffic
stop); Note, Custodial Engineering: Cleaning Up The Scope of Miranda Custody During Coercive
Terry Stops, 108 HARV. L. REV. 665, 667-77 (1995) (delineating the scope of Miranda warnings in
the context of a traffic stop).
20. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183-91.
21. Id. at 183. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6, Comment (Official Draft and Revised
Comments, 1962). The Court in Hiibel stated the “English vagrancy laws . . . required suspected
vagrants to face arrest unless they gave ‘a good Account of themselves.’” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183
(quoting 15 Geo. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (1744)). Vagrancy laws had a long history beginning in England, but
experienced a shift in objective from controlling serfs in the feudal system to serving law
enforcement as a means of crime prevention. T. Leigh Anenson, Comment, Another Casualty of the
War . . . Vagrancy Laws Target the Fourth Amendment, 26 AKRON L. REV. 493, 494-95 (1993). As
the vagrancy laws developed, various methods of abuse did as well. Id. at 495. The early English
laws of vagrancy developed for economic reasons. Jordan Berns, Comment, Is There Something
Suspicious About the Constitutionality of Loitering Laws?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 717 (1989)
(discussing the development of vagrancy laws as an introduction to an analysis of loitering laws
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and loitering statutes came through challenges under the Due Process
Clause.22 After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v.
Ohio,23 and with the end of vagrancy laws, many legislatures sought an
inchoate offense24 under which to detain a suspicious individual through
a legal, custodial arrest.25
Some jurisdictions adopted statutes similar to the one proposed in
initial draft of the Model Penal Code.26 However, the drafters of the
Model Penal Code expressed reservations over this provision’s
under the United States Constitution). The Americanization of these laws included using them as a
basis to prevent criminal activity. Id. at 718.
22. Harbist, supra note 17, at 589. Signaling the end for vagrancy statutes, the United States
Supreme Court overruled a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance in a unanimous decision. See
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972). The Court held the statute at issue
was void for vagueness because it did not provide fair notice and encouraged arbitrary police
enforcement. Id. at 162. The Court observed that the purpose of these statutes was to empower
police officers. See id. at 165.
23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this landmark decision, a Cleveland police officer
observed Terry and another man standing on a street corner outside of a downtown department
store. Id. at 5. The officer believed that the two men were preparing to rob the store. Id. He
approached the two men to investigate after they had conferred with a third man. Id. at 6-7. A
subsequent “patdown” search of the three men revealed that two of them, including Terry,
possessed handguns. Id. at 7. The United States Supreme Court heard the case to consider whether
the Fourth Amendment prohibited the introduction of the weapons into evidence. Id. at 8. The
Court affirmed the conviction, essentially making “stop and frisk” procedures part of the common
law. See id. at 8-10. The Court reasoned that police officers require a framework that allows them
to investigate and act on a level of suspicion less than the probable cause standard mandated by the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 10.
24. An inchoate offense is “[a] step toward the commission of another crime, the step in itself
being serious enough to merit punishment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1111 (8th ed. 2004).
Examples of inchoate offenses are attempt and conspiracy. Id.
25. Harbist, supra note 17, at 589. The majority of these jurisdictions turned to either the
Model Penal Code or the Uniform Arrest Act. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183. See Dix, supra note 17, at
913; Harbist, supra note 17, at 589.
26. Harbist, supra note 17, at 589 n.27 (citing Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir.
1974) (quoting a Henderson City Ordinance), rev’d on other grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)); People
v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 574 (1973) (recognizing that N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1967), was “very like” the draft of the Model Penal Code), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093
(1973); Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah 1975) (quoting a Salt Lake City
Ordinance), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 915 (1976). See also People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429
(1973) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e)(West 1970)), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). This
section of the Model Penal Code draft states:
A person who loiters or wanders without apparent reason or business in a place or
manner not usual for law-abiding individuals and under circumstances which justify
suspicion that he may be engaged or about to engage in crime commits a violation if he
refuses the request of a peace officer that he identify himself and give a reasonably
credible account of the lawfulness of his conduct and purposes.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). The drafters of the Model Penal Code
referred to this section being the last remnant of the laws of “vagrancy.” MODEL PENAL CODE §
250.12, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
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constitutionality.27 To address that issue, the authors drafted a revised
version, which contained elements calling for a more objective analysis
of an individual’s allegedly suspicious conduct.28 Both drafts of the
Model Penal Code retained elements of loitering laws.29 As with
historical vagrancy statutes,30 courts adjudicated statutes based on these
two versions of the Model Penal Code on due process grounds.31 Some
legislatures based modern statutes on the Uniform Arrest Act.32 These
27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). This section
states:
The reasons for doubt on that score are that a statute which makes it a penal offense for a
person to fail to identify himself and give an exculpatory account of his presence is in
effect an extension of the law of arrest, and trenches on the privilege against selfincrimination.
Id. The authors referenced a disorderly conduct case, intending it as a comparison between
disorderly conduct statutes and vagrancy statutes. Id. (discussing People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42
(1907)). They commented, “If the disorderly conduct statutes are troublesome because they require
so little in the way of misbehavior, the vagrancy statutes offer the astounding spectacle of
criminality with no misbehavior at all!” Id.
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1962). This revised
section states:
A person commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner
not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the
safety of persons or property in the vicinity. Among the circumstances which may be
considered in determining whether such alarm is warranted is the fact that the actor takes
flight upon appearance of a peace officer, refuses to identify himself, or manifestly
endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the actor or other
circumstance makes it impracticable, a peace officer shall prior to any arrest for an
offense under this section afford the actor an opportunity to dispel any alarm which
would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to identify himself and explain his
presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this Section if
the peace officer did not comply with the preceding sentence, or if it appears at trial that
the explanation given by the actor was true and, if believed by the peace officer at the
time, would have dispelled the alarm.
Id. This section of the Model Penal Code addressed the situation where activity rose to the level
where it required a police officer inquiry. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6, Comment (Official Draft
and Revised Comments, 1962). If this criterion was met, “[f]ailure to explain oneself satisfactorily
would constitute an offense.” Id. The circumstances involved in this section, which required some
“alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity,” changed from the tentative draft, which
required justifiable suspicion that the actor had committed or was about to commit a crime. Id.
29. See supra notes 26, 28 and accompanying text (stating the text of the drafts of the Model
Penal Code loitering provisions). As with the modern “stop and identify” statutes, the legislatures
designed loitering statutes to permit the arrest of an individual who had committed or was about to
commit a crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6, Comment (Official Draft and Revised Comments,
1962).
30. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing some of the history of vagrancy
laws).
31. See infra notes 35-56 and accompanying text (describing courts’ treatment of “stop and
identify” statutes on due process grounds).
32. Dix, supra note 17, at 913. The Uniform Arrest Act provides in pertinent part:
Questioning and Detaining Suspects.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 7
WARNER1.DOC

250

3/20/2006 9:17:49 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:245

statutes “authorized further police action if an ‘objectively suspicious’
subject ‘fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction
of the officer.’”33 Under these statutes, refusing a police officer’s
request for identification merely resulted in further detention.34
The New York Court of Appeals examined a statute similar to the
initial draft of the Model Penal Code,35 which also contained an
identification requirement and declared it unconstitutional.36 The court
noted that its paramount concern was vagueness,37 but also recognized
additional constitutional difficulties with the statute under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.38 Contrary to the New York Court
(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has reasonable ground to suspect
is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him
his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the
satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
UNIFORM ARREST ACT § 2(1)-(2) (1939), reprinted in Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28
VA. L. REV. 315, 320-21 (1942). This section encompassed more activity than current law at this
time. Warner, supra, at 321 (describing how the Uniform Arrest Act enlarged the scope of
detentions to include acts taking place at night and during the day). Four states adopted a “stop and
identify” provision based on the Uniform Arrest Act. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 253 n.1 (citing
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902 (1979); MO. ANN. STAT. § 84.710 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 594.2 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7.1 (1969)).
33. Dix, supra note 17, at 913.
34. Dix, supra note 17, at 913 (stating if the result of the refusal was at most a brief period of
detention, this constituted a less significant intrusion upon privacy interests than a potential
conviction); Sullivan, supra note 17, at 253 n.1 (stating the Uniform Arrest Act did not criminalize a
failure to comply with an identification requirement, not even to the point of being a misdemeanor).
See Warner, supra note 32, at 322 (describing the ramifications of refusal to identify oneself under
the Uniform Arrest Act).
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
36. People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 574 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973) (holding
that a loitering statute was unconstitutional as it impermissibly extended the discretion of law
enforcement officers). The statute in Berck provided for a loitering conviction if the defendant:
Loiters, remains or wanders in or about a place without apparent reason and under
circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or about to engage in
crime, and, upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to identify himself or fails to give a
reasonably credible account of his conduct and purposes.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6) (McKinney Supp. 1967). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6)
(McKinney Supp. 1967) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). The Court
of Appeals of New York found the statute to be unconstitutional as it did not afford the potential
defendant adequate notice of the prohibited conduct and placed sufficient discretion with police
officers as to encourage arbitrary enforcement. Berck, 32 N.Y. 2d at 571.
37. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d at 574.
38. Id. at 573-74. The court noted that “prohibiting such harmless conduct serves no
reasonable State interest consistent with the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 574. Furthermore,
the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges and immunities” clause through its
restrictions on the travel of individuals throughout New York. Id. (citing Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908)). The ordinance was
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, largely because of its identification requirement. Id.
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of Appeals, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a statute based on the early
draft of Model Penal Code in Salt Lake City v. Savage.39 The Utah court
viewed the statute as adequately clear for an ordinary citizen, while at
the same time discouraging overbearing conduct by police officers.40
Agreeing with the Utah Supreme Court, the California Court of Appeals
rejected a vagueness challenge to a similar statute.41 Taking into
account the then recent United States Supreme Court decisions,42 the
Finally, the court concluded, “While an officer may have a right to inquire into suspicious
circumstances, a suspect’s silence may not be used as a predicate for a separate offense such as
loitering.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969) (“While the police have
the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have
no right to compel them to answer.”)).
39. Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 38 (Utah 1975) (holding that the statute was not
ambiguous and therefore valid under the Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 915 (1976).
The court noted the language of the statute as follows:
A person is guilty of loitering when he:
(5) Loiters, remains or wanders in or about a building, lot, street, sidewalk, or any other
public or private place without apparent reason and under circumstances which justify
suspicion that he may be engaged in or about to engage in a crime, and
(a) upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to identify himself by name and address;
or
(b) after having given his name and address by inquiry of a police officer refuses or
fails to give a reasonably credible account of his conduct and purpose.
Id. at 1036.
40. Id. at 1038. Under the majority’s reading of the statute, a potential defendant understood
the criminality associated with his conduct. Id. Furthermore, the court did not envision a set of
circumstances where an innocent individual would arouse the reasonable suspicion of a police
officer. Id. The statute was empowering, a positive enactment, that allowed law enforcement to act
in the face of pending criminal activity. Id. However, Justice Tuckett wrote a separate opinion that
raised an important point. Id. (Tuckett, J., concurring). A portion of his concurrence stated, “[I]f
the ordinance were so construed as to mean that the lawfulness of a person’s action depends on the
opinion of a policeman, it would be unconstitutional.” Id.
41. People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 432 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
The statute at issue made a refusal to present identification a criminal offense:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a
misdemeanor:
...
(e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent
reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence
when requested by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding circumstances are such
as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970). Here, a California municipal court dismissed the case.
Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 431. The appellate court heard the case in order to reconsider its past
decision concerning the constitutionality of § 647(e). See People v. Weger, 251 Cal. App. 2d 584,
588 (1967) (finding § 647(e) to be constitutional), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968).
42. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (finding a vagrancy
ordinance unconstitutionally vague); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 425 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (upholding a California requirement that individuals involved in automobile accidents
divulge certain information); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 42 (1968) (holding a
requirement that gamblers register for an occupational tax violated the privilege against self-
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California court held the statute was constitutional.43
Possibly due to the constitutional infirmities associated with the
early draft of the Model Penal Code, a number of jurisdictions adopted
ordinances similar to the revised draft.44 Two city legislatures modeled
ordinances directly after this draft, and courts invalidated each of them
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 In City
of Bellevue v. Miller,46 the City charged the defendant with violating a
city vagrancy ordinance.47 The district court convicted Miller, and he
appealed to the superior court.48 The superior court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute was
The Supreme Court of Washington
unconstitutionally vague.49
affirmed.50 The second ordinance came to the Court of Appeals of
incrimination); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (outlining the principles of preventive
detentions short of traditional arrest).
43. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 436-39. With a foundation based on the reasonable suspicion
standard of Terry, the statute withstood a vagueness challenge. Id. at 435. The court rejected the
claim that the identification requirement violated the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 436.
The court reasoned that the state’s interest in regulating motor vehicles, coupled with strong
interests in public safety and crime prevention, overcame any individual’s interest in anonymity. Id.
at 436-37. Finally, the statute was not arbitrarily enforced, as it required an objective basis for the
detention. Id. at 438.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Rias, 524 F.2d 118, 121 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting MIAMI,
FLA., CITY CODE § 38-26); City of Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wash. 2d 539, 542-43 (1975) (en banc)
(quoting BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY CODE § 7.40.080); State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 856.021 (1972)); City of Portland
v. White, 9 Or. App. 239, 240 (1972) (quoting PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 14.92.045) (cited in
Harbist, supra note 17, at 589-92).
45. Harbist, supra note 17, at 591.
46. 85 Wash. 2d 539 (1975) (en banc).
47. Id. at 540. Originally, the City charged Miller with suspicion of burglary. Id. After the
City released him without filing charges, it notified Miller one month later that he violated the
vagrancy ordinance. Id. That ordinance read in part:
Any person who wanders or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner, and under
circumstances, which manifest an unlawful purpose or which warrant alarm for the
safety of persons or property in the vicinity is hereby declared to be a vagrant, and is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Among circumstances which may be considered as manifesting an unlawful purpose or
warranting alarm for the safety of persons or property, for purposes of this section, is
flight by a person upon the appearance of a police officer, the refusal of a person to
identify himself to a police officer, or an attempt by a person to conceal himself or any
object from a police officer.
BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY CODE § 7.40.080. Compare BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY CODE § 7.40.080
with MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1962), supra note 26.
The Supreme Court of Washington noted that the Bellevue statute was patterned after the final
version of the Model Penal Code. Miller, 85 Wash. 2d at 543.
48. Miller, 85 Wash. 2d at 540.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 547. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the statute was per se invalid. Id.
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Oregon under similar circumstances in City of Portland v. White.51 The
court of appeals affirmed the rulings of the lower courts, holding that the
statute at issue was unconstitutionally vague.52 Going against the
rationale of the Washington and Oregon courts, the Florida Supreme
Court rejected a vagueness challenge to a loitering ordinance.53 The
court reasoned that considerations of public safety and law enforcement
were of vital importance in construing the Florida statute.54
Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court did not find any potential
Fourth Amendment55 or Fifth Amendment implications. 56
The court stated, “In requiring one to speculate as to what conduct is proscribed and in providing
that criminal prosecution can proceed upon the highly arbitrary and inherently subjective opinion of
the arresting officer, the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.” Id. The court noted that the statute
must be defined conclusively, thereby discouraging arbitrary law enforcement. Id. at 543. The
court ultimately ruled that the ordinance’s scope was too broad. Id. at 544.
51. City of Portland v. White, 9 Or. App. 239, 239-40 (1972). The language of PORTLAND,
OR. CODE § 14.92.045 is the same as BELLEVUE, WASH. CITY CODE § 7.40.080 and MODEL PENAL
CODE § 250.6 (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1962). See id. at 239. Compare PORTLAND,
OR. CODE § 14.92.045 with BELLEVUE, WASH. CITY CODE § 7.40.080, supra note 31, and MODEL
PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1962), supra note 28. In White, both
the municipal and circuit courts held the statute to be unconstitutional. Id. at 239-40.
52. White, 9 Or. App. at 243. The court here concentrated on a similar concern of the
provision encouraging arbitrary police enforcement. See id. at 242-43. The court also referred to
the fact that the majority of modern courts held these types of loitering statutes to be
unconstitutional. Id. at 241. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 152, 171 (1972).
53. State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). The
Florida loitering statute at issue in this case was quite similar to the one in City of Bellevue v. Miller,
85 Wash. 2d 539 (1975), and stated in part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not
usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and
reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the
vicinity.
(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such
alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon
appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself, or manifestly
endeavors to conceal himself or any object.
FLA. STAT. § 856.021 (1972).
54. Ecker, 311 So. 2d at 109-10. The Florida Supreme Court distinguished its case from
previous cases in which the statute was ruled to be unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 109. As with its
current case, the court observed that in cases where statutes were upheld, a concern for public safety
was involved. Id. Finally, the court noted that the entire purpose of the statute was to provide an
effective tool for law enforcement to combat criminal activity. See id. at 110.
55. See id. The court found that the statute’s foundation on a reasonable suspicion standard
was satisfactory to discourage arbitrary enforcement. Id.
56. See id. at 109-10. “Under circumstances where the public safety is threatened, we find no
constitutional violation in requiring credible and reliable identification.” Id. at 109 (citing
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971)). The Florida Supreme Court viewed Byers as holding that
the “possibility of incrimination is insufficient,” especially given the disclosure of identity to be a
“neutral act.” Id. However, the court viewed additional disclosure requirements beyond identity to
be impermissible. Id. at 110.
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2. Modern “Stop and Identify” Statutes
The previously discussed decisions illustrate the difficulty courts
had in analyzing the precursors of modern “stop and identify” statutes,
which contained elements of old vagrancy laws.57 The vagrancy
statutes, which were too encompassing in scope, needed revisions in
order to survive a vagueness attack under the Due Process Clause.58 As a
result, some jurisdictions revised their laws, creating a new type of
statute that predicated arrest on an affirmative, objective act.59
In one of the first cases that addressed this new type of statute, the
Michigan Court of Appeals held an ordinance void for vagueness.60 In
that case, police responded to a report of suspicious activity.61 The
defendant, Gary DeFillippo, answered evasively when the police officers
requested identification.62 Officers arrested DeFillippo for failure to
produce identification in accordance with a Detroit city ordinance.63 A
search, subsequent to the arrest, revealed illegal narcotics, and the City
charged the defendant with drug possession.64 DeFillippo challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinance and requested that the evidence be

57. Harbist, supra note 17, at 594.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 107-14 (Smith-Hurd 1980); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 38.02 (Vernon 1974) (cited in Harbist, supra note 17, at 594 n.60). These jurisdictions generally
revised their statutes by removing references to loitering laws, but still maintaining a requirement of
identification in the context of a lawful investigative stop. Harbist, supra note 17, at 594.
Legislatures essentially made a failure to identify oneself a substantive offense. Id.
60. Harbist, supra note 17, at 594. The Michigan case was People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich.
App. 197, 201 (1977), rev’d on other grounds, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
61. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. at 199. Police received a call about drunken and disorderly
conduct in an alley. Id. The officers arrived on scene and found DeFillippo with a woman, who
was intoxicated. Id. The officers arrested the woman and requested identification from DeFillippo.
Id.
62. Id. DeFillippo informed the officers that he was “Sergeant Mash.” Id. When the officers
tried to confirm this, DeFillippo “replied that he was working for Sergeant Mash.” Id.
63. Id. The ordinance at issue provided:
When a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that the behavior of an individual
warrants further investigation for criminal activity, the officer may stop and question
such person. It shall be unlawful for any person stopped pursuant to this section to refuse
to identify himself, and to produce verifiable documents or other evidence of such
identification. In the event that such person is unable to provide reasonable evidence of
his true identity the police officer may transport him to the nearest precinct in order to
ascertain his identity.
DETROIT, MICH., MUN. CODE § 39-1-52.3 (1976) (quoted in DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. at 200-01).
64. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. at 199. It was not entirely clear whether a failure to produce
identification was a crime at the time of DeFillippo’s arrest. Id. at 201 n.1. A later amendment to
the statute, DETROIT ORDINANCE NO. 158-H (October 19, 1976), concretely decided that this failure
was indeed criminal activity. Id.
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suppressed. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed.65 The Michigan
court reasoned that the statute overly infringed on individual rights and
concluded that DeFillippo’s conviction was unconstitutional.66
B. United States Supreme Court Treatment of an Identification
Requirement
1. The Traffic Stop
The United States Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio67 and
its successors68 govern the “stop” portion of the “stop and identify”
statute.69 Terry set forth a two prong standard: first, inquiring whether
the police officer’s action was justified at the stop’s inception and,
second, examining whether the search or seizure was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the stop.70 An officer
fulfills the first requirement, which defines the parameters of a lawful
stop, if he or she witnesses a traffic violation directly or possesses
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.71 Once a police officer
establishes the presence of reasonable suspicion, he or she may then
conduct a limited frisk of the individual in the interest of safety or detain

65. See id. at 200-03. The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on the grounds
of vagueness. Id. at 201.
66. See id. at 202-03. The court offered several reasons for its holding, starting with the
statute’s lack of fair notice to persons of ordinary intelligence. Id. at 201 (citing United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)). Additionally, the ordinance had the potential of criminalizing
conduct that was not ordinarily criminal. Id. Perhaps most importantly, the court noted the
ordinance’s effect on individuals’ constitutional rights. See id. at 201-02. Finally, by authorizing
arrest on less than probable cause, in this case reasonable suspicion, the statute was invalid under
the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 202.
67. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The impetus behind the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Terry was to define the standards for forcible police encounters in the absence of both
probable cause and a warrant. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Marvel
or Mischief? Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911, 912-29
(1998) (discussing the history of the Terry decision).
68. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975) (holding that the
principles first outlined in Terry apply to investigative stops of vehicles); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (clarifying Terry through holding it permissible for police officers to detain
suspicious individuals for a brief period).
69. See Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 723 (1994) (defining a stop under the Terry doctrine). A stop under Terry
is analogous to a brief detention for investigative purposes. Id. A police officer may effectuate a
stop when he possesses reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.
70. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
71. McManus, supra note 19, at 60.
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the person in order to conduct an investigation.72 These principles have
even greater application in Hiibel, where the Nevada Supreme Court
found that Section 171.123 of the Nevada Revised Statutes represented a
codification of the Terry standard.73
2. The Identification Requirement
The Supreme Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer
may ask questions of a detained motorist during a traffic stop.74 Also,
the Court has decided that Miranda warnings75 are not applicable in the
case of a traffic stop.76 Several Supreme Court decisions contain
discussions relevant to the constitutionality of requiring a detained
citizen to disclose his identity.77 In the creation of the Terry doctrine,
72. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Terry was the decision in which the Court articulated the standard
for the “stop and frisk” encounter between police officers and detained citizens. Id. The “frisk”
portion of the Terry standard is analogous to the identification requirement in the Nevada Statute.
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2004). See also LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 9.2; Kathryn R.
Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme Court’s Multiple
Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1392 (2003) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-20).
73. State v. Lisenbee, 13 P.3d 947, 950 (Nev. 2000). The Nevada Supreme Court observed
that § 171.123(1) outlined the justification for the stop, and § 171.123(4) provided the limitations on
the subsequent encounter. See id.
74. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (holding that detained motorists
at a traffic stop are not subjected to a custodial interrogation and thus may be asked questions
without being informed of their constitutional rights). Generally, the Court noted that the
Constitution was not implicated when a police officer asked a citizen questions, even in the absence
of reasonable suspicion. Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991). The Supreme Court
has yet to address the exact scope or nature of police questioning subsequent to a traffic stop. See,
e.g., Bill Lawrence, Note, The Scope of Police Questioning During a Routine Traffic Stop: Do
Questions Outside the Scope of the Original Justification for the Stop Create Impermissible Seizures
If They Do Not Prolong the Stop?, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1919, 1920 (2003) (noting that the Court
had not addressed the permissible inquiries subsequent to a traffic stop), Amy L. Vazquez,
Comment, “Do You Have Any Drugs, Weapons, or Dead Bodies in Your Car?” What Questions
Can a Police Officer Ask During a Traffic Stop?, 76 TUL. L. REV. 211, 225 (2001) (observing that
the best solution to this issue would be United States Supreme Court review).
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda warnings protect against selfincrimination, and consist of informing an individual that he has the right to remain silent, that any
statement made may be used against him, and that he has the right to any attorney. See id. at 444.
Miranda warnings apply in the case of a custodial interrogation. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 434. The
Court in Miranda defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
76. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440-42 (concluding that the initial police questioning of a
motorist at a routine traffic stop does not constitute custodial interrogation for the purposes of the
Miranda rule). Hiibel did not argue that the officer should have given him Miranda warnings
before asking for his identification. Brief for the Petitioner at 15, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev.,
542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
77. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (recognizing that allowing an officer to
question a fleeing suspect must be in accord with the “individual’s right to go about his business or
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Justice White stated in his concurring opinion, “[O]f course, the person
stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and
refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert
the officer to the need for continued observation.”78 A majority of the
Court reiterated the sentiments of Justice White without establishing the
principle that a citizen need not respond to law enforcement questions as
law.79
3. Cases Involving Statutes with Identification Requirements
The United States Supreme Court had not addressed the
constitutionality of a “stop and identify” statute, compelling the
disclosure of a person’s identity, until its decision in Hiibel.80 However,
the Court had previously decided a case involving a statute that
contained an identification requirement.81 California v. Byers dealt with
the constitutionality of a state vehicular statute.82 Though not agreeing
on a majority opinion, the Court concurred on the holding that the statute
did not implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.83
The Court had analyzed disputes involving “stop and identify”
statutes, though not expressly ruling on the constitutionality of an
identification requirement in such a law.84 The cases of Michigan v.
to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning”); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 (stating
that a “detainee is not obliged to respond”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that a suspect is free to refuse to answer questions); Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 44 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that a detained motorist may
refuse to answer questions, and this refusal cannot furnish a basis for arrest); Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969) (discussing the principle that police officers cannot compel answers to
questions); Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (noting that citizens detained under the
principles of Terry should not be required to answer the police officer’s questions); Terry, 392 U.S.
at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that a citizen has the “right to ignore his interrogator and
walk away”).
78. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
79. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439; Davis, 394 U.S. at 727 n.6.
80. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 184 (2004). The Court explained the
Hiibel case continued the progression that is began in its previous decisions. Id.
81. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (plurality opinion).
82. Id. at 427. The statute provided that an individual involved in traffic accident had to
identify himself to the other party and the state. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002 (Deering 1971).
Byers was involved in an accident and charged with two misdemeanors, one for failure to maintain
a safe distance and the other for violating the identification requirement. Byers, 402 U.S. at 425-26.
83. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 427-34; Id. at 435-36 (Harlan, J., concurring). Because the statute
at issue was essentially regulatory in nature, the danger of incrimination from identity disclosure
was low. See id. at 427-31. Even operating under the assumption that such a statement would be
incriminating, it was not testimonial. See id. at 431-34.
84. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 352 (addressing the constitutionality of California “stop and
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DeFillippo85 and Brown v. Texas86 presented the Court with its first
opportunities to deconstruct “stop and identify” statutes and decide
whether an identification requirement violated any constitutional
rights.87 However, the Court did not address the applicable statutes’
constitutionality in these cases, but instead based its holdings on other
grounds.88
In DeFillippo, police officers arrested the defendant for violating a
Detroit city ordinance after he provided suspicious answers to a request
for identification.89 The Court scrutinized the decision of the Michigan
Court of Appeals, which found that the statute at issue was
unconstitutional.90 However, the Court did not rule on the “stop and
identify” statute’s constitutionality.91
The Court also failed to address the legitimacy of a “stop and
identify” statute in Brown.92 In that case, two police officers stopped
Brown under circumstances that their experience indicated Brown was
engaged in criminal activity.93 Subsequent to the stop, Brown declined
to identify himself.94 The Court analyzed Brown’s arrest by considering

identify” statute); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979) (analyzing a conviction under a Texas
“stop and identify” statute on Fourth Amendment grounds); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,
35 (1979) (deciding a case involving a Detroit city ordinance, though not discussing the statute’s
validity under the Constitution).
85. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
86. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
87. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 255.
88. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s holdings in
the DeFillippo and Brown cases).
89. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 33-34. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (providing
the facts of the DeFillippo case).
90. See DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 34-35. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text
(analyzing the Michigan court’s holding in DeFillippo).
91. See DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 35-40. Instead, the Court held that an officer’s good faith
reliance on the statute, even if it was later declared unconstitutional, was sufficient to validate the
arrest. See id. at 40. The extent of the discussion of the statute’s constitutionality was merely
recognizing that the Michigan Court of Appeals had held it unconstitutional. Keenan, supra note
17, at 290. However, it is possible to decide that the reason for the brevity of this discussion was an
implied approval of the lower court’s decision. Id. at 290-91.
92. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 53 n.3.
93. Id. at 48. The two officers saw Brown walking away from another man in a high crime
area of the City. Id. at 48-49. The men were actually seen apart, but testimony from one of the
officers demonstrated the officers believed the two men were together until the police arrived at the
location. Id. at 48.
94. Id. at 49. Brown was arrested for violating the Texas “stop and identify” statute, which
provided, “A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to report or gives a false report
of his name and residence address to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and requested
the information.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974).
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the reasonableness of his detention.95 The Court reasoned that no
evidence pointed to the presence of articulable suspicion,96 making the
initial detention unreasonable and leading to a reversal of Brown’s
conviction.97
The United States Supreme Court also examined the
constitutionality of a “stop and identify” statute in Kolender v. Lawson.98
Law enforcement officers detained Edward Lawson on fifteen separate
occasions over a period of almost two years under a California “stop and
identify” law.99 Lawson brought suit in California state court alleging
that the statute was unconstitutional.100 The state district court agreed.101
The United States Supreme Court analyzed the statute under the voidfor-vagueness standard,102 finding that it failed to provide adequate
enforcement guidelines to law enforcement.103 Thus, given the dangers
to individual liberties that this situation caused, the Court held the statute
to be unconstitutional.104
95. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-52. The Court held that Brown had been seized, and
determined the reasonableness of that seizure by balancing the relevant interests involved. See id. at
50-51.
96. Id. at 51-52. Furthermore, “the officers did not claim to suspect appellant of any specific
misconduct, nor did they have any reason to believe that he was armed.” Id. at 49.
97. Id. at 53. The lack of reasonable suspicion caused the application of the “stop and
identify” statute, as a basis for arrest, to violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
98. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983). Lawson presented a direct challenge to
the constitutionality of the statute, forcing the Court to examine the constitutionality of the “stop
and identify” law. See id.
99. Id. at 354. The California statute criminalized a failure to respond to a request for
identification making it a misdemeanor. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (providing the
text of the California statute). Of his fifteen detentions, Lawson was prosecuted twice and
convicted once. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 354.
100. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 354. Lawson sought a declaratory judgment stating the statute
was unconstitutional. Id. He also prayed for an injunction restricting enforcement of the statute, as
well as money damages. Id.
101. Id. The state district court found the statute to be too broad, and thus unconstitutional,
because it allowed arrest on less than probable cause. See id. The court granted the injunction, but
did not award money damages. Id.
102. See id. at 357-60. “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness so ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited, in addition, it must be written in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 357 (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Connally v. Gen.
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)).
103. Id. at 358. Without the presence of standards or guiding principles, enforcement of the
statute was completely in the discretion of police officers. See id.
104. See id. at 358-61. The Court noted that in the absence of any standards governing
enforcement, there is potential for arbitrary police conduct. See id. at 361. Additionally, conduct
which is relatively innocent to one police officer may be suspicious, and result in arrest, to another.
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C. Prior History of the “Stop and Identify” Statute in Nevada
The Nevada legislature adopted the predecessor to Section 171.123
of the Nevada Revised Statutes in 1969, basing it on language from the
Uniform Arrest Act.105 The applicable portions of Section 171.123
provide:
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer
encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the
person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.
...
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to
ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his
presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but
may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.
4. A person must not be detained longer than is reasonably necessary
to effect the purposes of this section, and in no event longer than 60
minutes. The detention must not extend beyond the place or the
immediate vicinity of the place where the detention was first effected,
unless the person is arrested.106

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
offered a different construction of the statute than the Nevada Supreme
Court did in Hiibel.107 In Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, the
only prior case examining the identification requirement in Section
171.123, the Ninth Circuit faced a pattern of facts similar to Hiibel.108
See id. at 360.
105. Dix, supra note 17, at 862.
106. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004). Of special note, the original version of the statute
stipulated any detention could not last longer than fifteen minutes. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123
(1969). A subsequent amendment changed the applicable duration to thirty minutes. NEV. REV.
STAT. § 171.123 (1975). Other than these changes and the addition of current subsection 2 (thereby
necessitating a re-ordering of the subsections within the statute), the current statute is the same as
the one enacted in 1969. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004) with NEV. REV. STAT. §
171.123 (1969).
107. Compare Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding the Nevada “stop and identify” statute violated the Fourth Amendment), with Hiibel v.
Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1202 (Nev. 2002) (holding the Nevada statute did not violate
the Fourth Amendment), aff’d, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
108. See Carey, 279 F.3d at 876-77; Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203. The casino suspected Carey and
a friend of criminal activity, namely cheating. Carey, 279 F.3d at 876. After leaving and then
returning to the casino, Agent Spendlove of the Nevada Gaming Control Board detained Carey. Id.
The agent informed Carey of his Miranda rights and then searched him for contraband. Id. Next,
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However, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was contrary to that of the
Nevada Supreme Court; the circuit court held that the “stop and
identify” statute violated protections guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.109 The conflict over these different interpretations of
Section 171.123 further exemplifies the difficulty that courts and police
officers have in interpreting “stop and identify” statutes.110
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
On May 21, 2000, Humboldt County Sheriff’s Deputy Lee Dove
responded to a report of an assault.111 Dove located the vehicle
described in the report and proceeded to investigate.112 He found
Dudley Hiibel standing outside the vehicle and his daughter seated
inside of it.113 As Deputy Dove approached the vehicle, he saw
indications that, in his estimation, Hiibel was intoxicated.114
Agent Spendlove asked Carey to identify himself, and he refused. Id. The agent determined that
there was a lack of probable cause under which to arrest Carey for a violation of gaming laws, but
did arrest him for the failure to produce identification. Id.
109. Carey, 279 F.3d at 880-81. The Ninth Circuit based its decision on its previous holdings
in Martinelli v. City of Beaumont, 820 F.2d 1491, 1492 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a California
statute violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures), and
Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding a California statute void for
vagueness, and not addressing a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim), aff’d, 461 U.S. 352
(1983). Id. at 800. A primary concern for the circuit court, which it reiterated in Carey, was
permitting arrests on less than probable cause. See id.
110. Brief for the Petitioner at 11, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No.
03-5554).
111. County of Humboldt v. Hiibel, No. XX-69056, slip op. at 1 (J. Ct. of Union Twp., Nev.,
Feb. 21, 2001) (unpublished decision from Justice Court of Union Township). A citizen allegedly
witnessed two people, a male and a female, involved in a domestic altercation on Grass Valley
Road. Id. Hiibel provided some insight on the dispute on his personal website. See Hiibel’s home
page, Facts page, http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/facts.html (last visited March 21, 2005).
Hiibel stated that the incident began as an altercation between himself and his daughter, Mimi, over
her current relationship. Id. The argument escalated, and “Mimi got mad at her dad and punched
him in the shoulder.” Id. “They continued shouting at one another . . . and Mimi eventually pulled
over the truck after [Hiibel] said he wanted out.” Id. The citizen identified the vehicle involved as a
silver and red GMC truck. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 1.
112. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 1-2. Deputy Dove assumed it was the vehicle in the report from
dispatch. Id. at 2. He had also received further reports from a witness identifying the vehicle. Id.
His assumption became more concrete when he observed the location of the vehicle. Id. Deputy
Dove believed the truck had pulled off the road hastily, evidenced by skid marks and the truck being
parked in an awkward position. Id.
113. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (No. 03-5554).
114. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 2. Dove based his belief that Hiibel was intoxicated on Hiibel’s
appearance and actions. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (No. 03-5554). However,
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Rather than question Hiibel regarding the report of domestic battery
or his perceived intoxication, Dove first requested Hiibel’s
identification.115 Maintaining his innocence, Hiibel refused this initial
request.116 Dove continued to make demands for identification.117 At
one point during the exchange, Hiibel placed his hands behind his back,
challenged Dove’s authority and requested that the deputy arrest him.118
Dove asked Hiibel to cooperate, but Hiibel declined and Dove arrested
him.119 In all, Hiibel refused to produce identification a total of eleven
times.120
B. Procedural History
The County of Humboldt charged Dudley Hiibel with obstructing
an officer investigating a crime,121 a violation of the Nevada “stop and
identify” statute, 122 and domestic violence.123 The Justice Court of
Dove did not arrest Hiibel for driving under the influence or any alcohol-related crime. See Hiibel,
No. XX-69056 at 2.
115. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 2. Dove made a quick reference to the “fight” before repeatedly
requesting identification from Hiibel. Videotape: Hiibel Arrest (http://www.papersplease.org/
hiibel/video.html (last visited March 21, 2005)). Dove derived his authority to request Hiibel’s
identity from NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3). Brief for Respondent at 1, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (No.
03-5554).
116. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 2. In response to this initial request, Hiibel informed Dove that
he would cooperate. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (No. 03-5554). However,
Hiibel professed his innocence, stating that he would not produce identification for this reason. Id.
117. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 2. Hiibel continued to refuse the requests of Dove. Id. At one
point, Hiibel asked for the purpose of the requests. Id. For the first time, Dove informed Hiibel
about the report of a domestic battery. Id.
118. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (No. 03-5554).
119. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 2. The Nevada Supreme Court opinion quoted Dove’s
statements that he thought Hiibel was becoming aggressive. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 59
P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002), aff’d, 542 U.S. 177 (June 21, 2004). Dove arrested Hiibel, placed
him in handcuffs, and escorted him to his police vehicle. Id. Dove based the arrest on the refusal to
produce identification, the inability to carry on his investigation, Hiibel’s perceived intoxication,
and concern for Dove’s own safety. Id.
120. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 2. Dove finally informed Hiibel that continuing to refuse to
produce identification would result in his arrest for obstructing an officer. Id.
121. NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2004) (“A person who, in any case or under any
circumstances not otherwise specially provided for, willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public
officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office shall be punished.”).
122. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004). See supra note 106 and accompanying text (stating
the text of the Nevada “stop and identify” statute). Other states have enacted similar “stop and
identify” statutes to Nevada. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 856.021(2) (2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
140.50(1) (2004). The Supreme Court discussed the various “stop and identify” statutes, stating:
The statutes vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect
to disclose his identity . . . . In some States, a suspect’s refusal to identify himself is a
misdemeanor offense or civil violation; in others, it is a factor to be considered in
whether the suspect has violated loitering laws. In other States, a suspect may decline to
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Union Township convicted Hiibel on the charge of delaying an officer124
and dismissed the domestic battery charge, which had prompted Dove’s
initial investigation.125 Hiibel appealed his conviction to the Sixth
Judicial District Court of Nevada, arguing that his conviction violated
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.126 The court rejected Hiibel’s
arguments and affirmed his conviction.127
identify himself without penalty.
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183.
123. NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2004).
124. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 3. The following is a description of the Justice Court of Union
Township:
Union Justice Court is a court of limited jurisdiction which strives to uphold the public’s
trust and confidence, while retaining its independence and accountability by dealing with
each matter in an equitable and timely manner . . . . [T]he Court issues search warrants
and arrest warrants, holds arraignments and trials for misdemeanor cases, and handles
felony and gross misdemeanor cases from the initial arrest through the preliminary
hearing stage, including bail setting and probable cause determination.
Union Justice Court home page, http://www.hcnv.us/justice/justice_home.htm (last visited March
21, 2005). The Justice of the Peace, Gene Wambolt, based his ruling, at least in part, on the
potential for injury in a domestic battery situation, and Dove’s initial observations of the scene.
Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 2. Furthermore, Justice Wambolt reasoned that Deputy Dove’s conduct
was not “overbearing or harassing.” Id. Justice Wambolt ultimately found two arguments
compelling, one based on the text of the statute, and the other on Supreme Court precedent. Id. The
text of the statute was particularly important, as Justice Wambolt stated that the “person so
identified shall identify himself.” Id. (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2003) (emphasis in
original)). The final argument, based on precedent, relied heavily on the magnitude of the
governmental interests of crime prevention and detection. Id. at 3 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968)).
125. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 (motion to dismiss). The prosecution filed the motion to dismiss
on September 29, 2000, based on an inability to locate the eyewitness. Id. The court granted the
motion that same day. Id. (order of dismissal).
126. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Hiibel v. State, No. CR 01-4463 (6th Jud. Dist. Ct., Nev., May 4,
2001). Hiibel contended that his conviction violated the Fourth Amendment through the obligations
it placed on him during the investigatory stop. Id. He argued that the United States Supreme Court
had previously held that someone in his position was not obligated to respond to any police officer
inquiries. Id. (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)). As for his Fifth Amendment
challenge, Hiibel argued that Dove imposed a necessity on him to disclose his identity when the
deputy asked him if he would “cooperate and identify himself.” Id. This obligation violated
Hiibel’s privilege against self-incrimination. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
127. Hiibel v. State, No. CR 01-4463, slip op. at 7 (6th Jud. Dist. Ct., Nev., June 25, 2004).
The Sixth Judicial District Court, Judge Richard Wagner presiding, noted that this case presented a
novel question in the State of Nevada, as the law was unsettled by both the Nevada Supreme Court
and United States Supreme Court. Id. at 1. Judge Wagner stated that a citizen must only answer a
question concerning identification if the police officer had reasonable suspicion. Id. at 2. Judge
Wagner observed that there was articulable suspicion for drunk driving at a minimum. Id at 6.
However, the district judge did not rule on the constitutionality of the statute, instead finding “that
there was sufficient evidence under the totality of the circumstances of this case that the justice
court could and did correctly conclude that Appellant [Larry Hiibel] resisted or delayed officer Lee
Dove.” Id. at 3-4. Finally, the court conducted a balancing test, weighing the protection of societal
interests against Hiibel’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Id. at 7. In the interests of both
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On further review, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the
judgment of the Sixth Judicial District Court in a divided opinion.128
The majority rejected Hiibel’s Fourth Amendment challenge.129 The
court also examined Hiibel’s petition for rehearing, seeking explicit
resolution of his Fifth Amendment claim, but denied it without
opinion.130 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 20,
2003.131
C. United States Supreme Court Opinion
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Nevada Supreme Court.132 The Court addressed both of Hiibel’s
police officers and victim protection, sufficiently serious in a case of domestic battery, the district
court ruled that a citizen must identify himself. Id. at 7-8.
128. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002), aff’d, 542 U.S. 177
(2004) (affirming judgment of Sixth Judicial District Court and denying a petition for writ of
certiorari). The en banc hearing of the Nevada Supreme Court ended in a 4-3 decision with Justice
Agosti, joined by two other justices, dissenting. Id. at 1207-10 (Agosti, J., dissenting). Justice
Agosti expressed concerns over a denial of the right to privacy, based on constitutional protections
afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1207-08. The dissent viewed United States Supreme
Court precedent as holding that police officers may ask detained citizens any question, but the
detainee is not required to answer. Id. at 1208 Justice Agosti referenced the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying United States Supreme Court precedent to NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3)). Id. In Carey,
the Ninth Circuit held that § 171.123(3) violated the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s
recognition that an individual has a right not to answer a police officer’s questions. Carey, 279 F.3d
at 881-82 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211 (1979) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 34 (1968)). Justice Agosti performed the same balancing test as the majority, weighing
governmental law enforcement justifications against individual privacy interests. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at
1207-08 (Agosti, J., dissenting). However, he viewed anonymity as being a civil liberty deserving
of protection under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1208. Justice Agosti expressed reservations
about the justifications given by the majority for its holding. Id. at 1209. He wrote, “[T]he majority
relies upon FBI statistics about police fatalities and assaults to support its argument. However, it
does not provide any evidence that an officer, by knowing a person’s identity, is better protected
from potential violence.” Id. An officer already has the right to perform a limited pat-down search
of a detainee in the interests of officer safety, and adding a requirement of disclosing one’s identity
to a police officer is too much of a deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
129. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1202. The majority reasoned there was no Fourth Amendment
violation, basing its decision on a proper balance between individual privacy interests and the need
to protect police officers and the public. Id. The court referenced a split in the federal circuit courts
of appeal, but found the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Carey to be “unpersuasive.” Id. at 1204. The
majority performed its own constitutional analysis, even recognizing the importance of privacy
rights and discussing freedom from being compelled to divulge one’s identity. Id. at 1205. The
court ultimately held the invasion of privacy by requiring one to identify himself was reasonable,
especially given the governmental interests in a new society filled with greater terrorism concerns.
See id. at 1205-06.
130. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 182 (2004).
131. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 540 U.S. 965 (2003) (granting writ of certiorari).
132. Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (affirming the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court).
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constitutional challenges to his conviction,133 holding that Hiibel’s
conviction did not violate his Fourth Amendment134 or Fifth Amendment
rights.135 The majority discussed previous cases in which the Court
applied constitutional limitations to “stop and identify” statutes,136 but
found enough characteristics to distinguish those cases from the present
case.137
133. Id. at 178-79. The majority of the Nevada Supreme Court only addressed Hiibel’s Fourth
Amendment challenge. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (examining the holding of
the Nevada Supreme Court).
134. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 at 185-89. The Fourth Amendment addresses “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The majority viewed the ability to ask questions as an essential
portion of a police investigation. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185. “[A] police officer is free to ask a person
for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment.” Id. The Court referenced many past
decisions where it stated that questioning is a routine portion of any traffic stop. Id. (quoting United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)). The majority discussed the important governmental interests
served by a “stop and identify” statute, including helping the officer to decide if the citizen had an
outstanding warrant. Id. The Court noted that these interests become even more pressing in the
case of a domestic disturbance, stating, “[O]fficers called to investigate domestic disputes need to
know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and
possible danger to the potential victim.” Id. These concerns, combined with the reasonable basis of
the Nevada statute, guarded against any potential Fourth Amendment violation. See id. at 188-89.
135. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189-91. The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Instead of
deciding the case on the basis of statements being non-testimonial, the Court held that the disclosure
of Hiibel’s identity would not have been incriminating. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189. The majority
defined an incriminating statement as one that the witness reasonably believes would result in
criminal prosecution or evidence that would lead to prosecution. Id. “In this case, petitioner’s
refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name
would be used to incriminate him.” Id. at 190. The majority could not discern the exact reason for
Hiibel’s failure to disclose his name. Id. Hiibel described himself on his personal website as “his
own man.” Hiibel’s home page, http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/index2.html (last visited March
21, 2005). He also implied his challenge to his conviction was based on “his belief in the U.S.
Constitution.” Id. Ultimately, absent any reasonable proof of an incriminating statement, the Court
held that there was no reason to override the Nevada legislature on Fifth Amendment grounds.
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 190-91. The majority reserved judgment in the case that providing one’s name
at a traffic stop would provide the police officer with evidence necessary to convict the detainee of a
separate offense. Id.
136. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 184. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1983) (holding
that requiring a detained citizen to provide “credible and reliable” identification gives too much
discretion to police officers without an identifiable standard, making it unconstitutionally vague);
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979) (overturning a conviction based on a Texas “stop and
identify” statute because the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic
stop initially).
137. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 184-95. Though not providing rationale as to how it arrived at its
conclusion, the majority found there to be reasonable suspicion that Hiibel had committed a crime.
See id. at 184. (differentiating the present case from Brown). The Court in Brown found the
defendant’s activity sufficed to establish reasonable suspicion. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-52.
Presence in an alley alone, even though the alley is allegedly frequented by drug users, is too close
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Justice Stevens submitted a dissent addressing potential Fifth
Amendment concerns with “stop and identify” statutes.138 He viewed
the privilege against self-incrimination as preempting the exception
authored by the Nevada legislature.139 He reasoned that previous cases
extended the privilege to encounters outside of criminal court
proceedings, and that the privilege should apply to situations like the
present case.140 Justice Stevens addressed the State of Nevada’s
argument141 that the statement was not testimonial.142 Finally, Justice
Stevens disagreed with the majority, reasoning that the Court’s
precedent viewed the word “incriminating” much more broadly than the
majority.143
to the activity exhibited by innocent pedestrians. Id. at 52. Also, the Court stated that there was no
challenge that the Nevada statute was unconstitutionally vague, as its terms were more narrow and
precise than the statute in Kolender. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 184. The statute in Kolender required
the suspect to present “credible and reliable” identification. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357 (quoting
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970)).
138. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 191-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 192. Justice Stevens hypothesized that the Nevada legislature required only a
detainee’s name because it realized that any additional questions would implicate the Fifth
Amendment. Id.
140. Id. “[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of
action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” Id.
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). Justice Stevens referenced three particular
situations in which the United State Supreme Court extended a privilege against self-incrimination.
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Carter v. Kentucky, the Court extended the right
to the indicted defendant, who may not be punished for invoking that right. Id.; see also Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299-300 (1981). An individual, even if unindicted and merely the subject
of a grand jury investigation, possesses this same right. Hiibel, 542 at 193; see also Chavez v.
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767-68 (2003). Finally, the Court extended the right to “an arrested suspect
during custodial interrogation in a police station.” Hiibel, 542 at 193 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
467). Justice Stevens observed that there is no reason that a person investigated on mere police
suspicion, rather than these higher standards, should not have protection against self-incrimination.
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referencing a claim made by the State of
Nevada that the Fifth Amendment challenge could be decided on the ground that the
communication was nontestimonial).
142. Id. at 193-94. Justice Stevens reasoned that although certain actions fall outside the scope
of the privilege, “[i]n all instances, we have afforded Fifth Amendment protection if the disclosure
in question was being admitted because of its content rather than some other aspect of the
communication.” Id. at 194. The Court stated the overwhelming majority of verbal statements
convey information or relate facts. Id.; Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988). Thus, most
verbal statements are testimonial and, for that reason, fall under the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self incrimination. Id. at 213-14. Additionally, Justice Stevens recognized the importance
of the communication coming at the bequest of a police officer. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 194-95
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In the context of a Sixth Amendment challenge, the Court recently
explained that statements given to police officers during an interrogation are testimonial. Id.;
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
143. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority gave a much narrower
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Justice Breyer authored a dissent in which Justices Souter and
Ginsburg joined.144 He discussed Supreme Court precedent as requiring
police officers to conduct traffic stops within specific limitations.145
Justice Breyer reasoned that the Court should have relied upon this
precedent and not changed a traditional traffic stop condition that does
not require answers to a police officer’s questions.146
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Application of the Void for Vagueness Doctrine
An effective introduction to a challenge of “stop and identify”
statutes is the same procedure used in the past to invalidate vagrancy and
loitering laws – the void-for-vagueness or vagueness doctrine.147 The
view of what constitutes an incriminating statement. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
Justice Stevens reiterated the fact that the statement itself does not have to be incriminating, as long
as it leads to evidence that could be used against the individual in a criminal proceeding. See
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reasoned if an officer was not
going to use an individual’s identity to incriminate him or her, or to locate further evidence, there
would be no reason to ask for it. Id. at 195-96. Justice Stevens stated, “[T]he Nevada Legislature
intended to provide its police officers with a useful law enforcement tool, and the very existence of
the statute demonstrates the value of the information it demands.” Id. Justice Stevens viewed
identity as incriminating, even if a name is not, as a person’s identity leads to a wealth of
information for law enforcement. Id. All of this information, reasoned Justice Stevens, has the
possibility for subsequent use in a criminal prosecution. Id.
144. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 197 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145. See id. The United States Supreme Court first outlined the standard for interaction
between police officers and motorists in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). See supra notes
68-74 and accompanying text (describing the Terry stop). Justice Breyer viewed a limit the Court
imposed in Terry as invalidating any statute that requires a response to police questioning. Hiibel,
542 U.S. at 197 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 198-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer further observed
the majority’s reasoning was contrary to previous Court statements. See, e.g., Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring). Justices in both
cases supported the proposition that police officers could ask any question of individuals, but such
individuals did not have to answer. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439; Terry, 392 U.S. at 34. Justice
Breyer observed this long line of statements has been viewed by the legal system as law, remaining
unchanged for twenty years. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 198 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer viewed
the majority’s reasoning as suspect, as there was no finding that a refusal to provide identification
had interfered with law enforcement. Id. at 199. Instead, discarding these rules could result in
further encroachment on an individual’s privacy rights. See id. at 198.
147. Berns, supra note 21, at 718. Courts utilize the void-for-vagueness doctrine to discern
whether a given statute will survive a facial challenge on vagueness grounds. Michael C. Steel,
Note, Constitutional Law - The Vagueness Doctrine: Two-Part Test, or Two Conflicting Tests?
City of Chicago v. Morales, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 255, 257 (2000) (observing the vagueness
doctrine presents one avenue to challenge a statute on its face). Several state courts have
invalidated vagrancy or loitering statutes using this doctrine. See, e.g., City of Bellevue v. Miller,
85 Wash. 2d 539, 540, (1975); People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 574, (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 7
WARNER1.DOC

268

3/20/2006 9:17:49 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:245

rationale for this doctrine originates in the constitutional safeguards of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.148 The void-for-vagueness
doctrine requires a criminal statute to provide: (1) sufficient clarity of
the offense so as to discourage arbitrary enforcement of its provisions;
and (2) fair notice of the criminal activity to citizens of average
intelligence.149
1. Components of the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
The Supreme Court identifies the prohibition against arbitrary or
discriminatory police action as the more important of the two void-forvagueness elements.150 A statute is unconstitutional under the Due
1093 (1973); City of Portland v. White, 9 Or. App. 239, 243, (1972). But see State v. Ecker, 311
So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 197-201 (1985)
(discussing the vagueness doctrine as it related to penal laws); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 85-114 (1960)
(analyzing the development of the vagueness doctrine); Mark A. Richard, Comment, The Void-forVagueness Doctrine in Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.: Revision
or Misapplication?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1279-91 (1983) (examining the vagueness doctrine in
the context of a United States Supreme Court decision).
148. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 920 (West 2005) (recognizing that the void-forvagueness doctrine finds its origins in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Rene M. LaForte,
Comment, The Constitutional Implications of Anti-Drug Loitering Ordinances in Ohio, 18 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 423, 430 (1993) (analyzing an Ohio anti-drug loitering ordinance in part by using
the void-for-vagueness doctrine). See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,
cl. 3. The Fifth Amendment provides the federal government shall not deprive a person “of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. The Fourteenth
Amendment extend the same constitutional protection, guarding against interference by state
governments. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. The void-for-vagueness doctrine represents a
fundamental requirement placed upon criminal statutes by federal and state constitutions. 21 AM.
JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 15 (West 2005) (discussing the basic constitutional premise of the void-forvagueness doctrine). See also Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 288-90 (1963); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-94 (1926).
149. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972);
Connally, 269 U.S. at 391). The vagueness doctrine does not require absolute certainty in statutory
provisions. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 16 (West 2005) (discussing the certainty required for
the vagueness doctrine). A statute may be upheld, even if the Court decides that the statute could be
more explicit or precise. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 (1975) (recognizing even those statutes
which the legislature could write with greater precision are not necessarily invalid under the Due
Process Clause); United States v. Overstreet, 106 F.3d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding even if
the terms of the statute could be more explicit, it is not necessarily unconstitutional), cert. denied,
Warren v. United States, 521 U.S. 1109 (1997). The Court does not require impossible standards of
definiteness. See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 95 (1975). Furthermore, a statute is
constitutional, even though its provisions are “stringent and harsh.” Barsky v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of the State of New York, 347 U.S. 442, 448 (1954).
150. Hallock, supra note 17, at 1060 (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is imprecise and
indefinite, thereby encouraging subjective, and possibly discriminatory
enforcement.151 Additionally, a statute is unconstitutional if it is
overbroad and thereby impinges upon constitutionally protected
rights.152 The legislature must explicitly define an appropriate standard
of conduct.153
The fair notice component requires that a criminal statute provide a
person of ordinary intelligence with forewarning that certain conduct
would be illegal.154 The Supreme Court has stated, “No one may be
required under peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
“Where inherently vague statutory language permits . . . selective law enforcement, there is a denial
of due process.” Smith, 415 U.S. at 576. The Supreme Court has analyzed numerous loitering and
vagrancy statutes under the vagueness doctrine. See John P. Ludington, Annotation, Supreme
Court’s Views Regarding Validity of Criminal Disorderly Conduct Statutes Under Void-forVagueness Doctrine, 75 L. ED. 2D 1049 (2004).
151. See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 60; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974);
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 165; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937). A statute cannot subsist on indefinite terms, hoping to
encompass all offenders. See Keenan, supra note 17, at 294. These types of statutes leave
enforcement of law to the complete discretion of law enforcement officials, and therefore, cannot
survive due process analysis. See id.
152. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S.
564, 584 (2002); L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999); City
of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458-59 (1987); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S.
293, 296 (1961); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-49 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940). To
some extent, flexibility in the law is permissible if it does not reach too broadly. See 21 AM. JUR.
2D Criminal Law § 16. However, the concern for minimal guidelines finds its origins as far back as
the 19th century. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876). These problems are
aggravated when the statute at issue inhibits freedoms and rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979).
153. Hallock, supra note 17, at 1060. If the legislature does not adequately perform the task of
defining the penal conduct, it risks creating an environment which encourages discriminatory police
conduct. Id. Laws without proper standards provide the ability for a police officer and other
officials to confront a particular individual, based upon his or her own displeasure, with some
characteristic unique to that individual. Berns, supra note 21, at 719. The freedom, or lack thereof,
for the suspect in these cases depends almost completely upon the individual motivations of the
officer involved. Id.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979); Colautti, 439 U.S. at
390; Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); 21 AM.
JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 15 (West 2005). The phrasing of the intelligence requirement is different
in varying jurisdictions, but the basic premise is the same. See United States v. Makowski, 120 F.3d
1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating due process requires that individuals of “common intelligence”
should not question the statute’s meaning), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1019 (1997); United States v.
Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 878 (2d Cir. 1997) (requiring “ordinary people” be able to identify the
prohibited conduct), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 904 (1997); State v. Hart, 687 So. 2d 94, 95 (La. 1997)
(stating individuals of “reasonable intelligence” must be able to understand the statute). To
decipher whether or not the warning is adequate, the court will measure it against “common
understanding or practice.” See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 243 (West 2005).
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meaning of penal statutes.”155 The rationale behind this provision is
simple: no person should be found guilty of conduct which he or she
could not reasonably understand was criminal.156
2. Application of the Vagueness Doctrine to “Stop and Identify”
Statutes
Previous cases construing “stop and identify” statutes reveal that
these laws are assailable under the void for vagueness doctrine on three
fronts.157 First, the statute is vulnerable to a challenge for failure to
provide a standard by which to evaluate the suspect’s response to the
identification request.158 Second, the state courts are clear that
additional reliance on language from loitering or vagrancy laws will
suffice for a vagueness challenge.159 Finally, any provision requiring
that an individual “account for his presence” to the satisfaction of the
police is impermissible, as the statute gives too much discretion to police
officers in its enforcement.160
The analysis of Section 171.123 of the Nevada Revised Statutes,
must begin with a comparison to a statute that meets the three
requirements just set forth.161 A “stop and identify” statute that survives
155. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Suspects are entitled to have an
understanding of the conduct a state seeks to criminalize. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162.
156. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617.
157. Hallock, supra note 17, at 1061. Presumably, the Nevada ordinance in Hiibel is not
unconstitutionally vague. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 184 (2004). However, the
Court did not affirmatively decide this issue, as Hiibel failed to raise this claim. Id. The Court did
view the Nevada statute as “narrower and more precise” than the “stop and identify” statute the
Court previously invalidated in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). Id.
158. Hallock, supra note 17, at 1061. In Kolender, vagueness was the primary challenge to the
California statute. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. The California state courts construed the statute as
requiring “credible and reliable” identification, for which it provided no standard. Id. The police
officer made the ultimate determination as to when the identification is satisfactory. See id.
159. Hallock, supra note 17, at 1061. See supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also
Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding Nevada vagrancy ordinance addressing
loitering unconstitutional under the void for vagueness doctrine), rev’d on other grounds, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). Loitering statutes can fail a vagueness challenge through a failure to provide fair
notice, see Powell, 507 F.2d at 95, as well as by encouraging arbitrary police enforcement.
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162. Papachristou essentially signaled the end for the vagrancy statute.
See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171.
160. Hallock, supra note 17, at 1061-62. Both the initial draft and the revised version of the
Model Penal Code contained this language. See supra notes 26, 28 and accompanying text (stating
the text of these early drafts of the Model Penal Code).
161. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (providing three challenges to “stop and
identify” statutes under the vagueness doctrine). The statute that supposedly fulfills the three
possible challenges to a “stop and identify” statute provides:
(1) A person commits a misdemeanor if, when stopped by a peace officer having a
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a vagueness challenge is consistent with the Nevada provision in some
facets, most notably the stopping of individuals.162 However, the two
statutes differ on one provision that is pertinent to an examination under
the void-for-vagueness doctrine.163 The non-vague “stop and identify”
statue provides a clear basis upon which an officer can evaluate the
suspect’s response to the identification request.164 To the contrary,
Section 171.123 provides no standard under which to assess a reply.165
By ignoring history and tradition,166 the Nevada “stop and identify”
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in light of the officer’s experience, that the person was about to commit, is
committing, or had committed a crime, he
(a) refuses to state his name and address or provide documentation of his name and
address, such as, but not limited to, a driver’s license, credit card, or social security
card, after being requested by a peace officer to produce identification; or
(b) falsely reports his name or address to a peace officer.
(2) A peace officer who stops a person under this statute may detain the person at the
situs of the stop for a reasonable period of time not to exceed twenty minutes for the
purpose of verifying the name and address disclosed by the person through sources such
as a telephone book, a city directory, or law enforcement records.
Hallock, supra note 17, at 1062. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004) with supra note 106.
162. See supra notes 106, 161, and accompanying text (stating the text of the Nevada “stop and
identify” statute and the “stop and identify” statute which survives a vagueness challenge). Both
statutes have a foundation in the Terry standard. See id. The non-vague statute contains a reference
to “reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts,” Hallock, supra note 17, at 1062, which is quite
similar to the language used in Terry. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The Nevada statute
requires a similar basis for police to begin an encounter with an individual under suspicion of
criminal activity. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(1) (2004). Also, both statutes provide some limit
as to the timeframe of the detention, either 20 or 60 minutes. Hallock, supra note 17, at 1062; NEV.
REV. STAT. § 171.123(4) (2004).
163. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004) with Hallock, supra note 17, at 1062. The
difference in the statutes unequivocally makes the Nevada statute susceptible to a vagueness
challenge, both for not providing fair notice and also for encouraging arbitrary enforcement. See
supra notes 150-56 (describing the two components of the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
164. Hallock, supra note 17, at 1062. This statute is clear in requiring verification through “a
book, a city directory, or law enforcement records.” Id.
165. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2004). The statute fails to provide any further
information, other than requiring identification. Id. It is ambiguous as to what the Nevada
legislature means by the phrase “identify himself.” Id. The Nevada Supreme Court tried to clarify
the statute by stating a suspect must disclose his name. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 59 P.3d
1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002), aff’d, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (examining the limits of the identification
requirement in the Nevada statute). However, the Nevada Supreme Court differed in how it
discussed the requirement, going from stating the suspect must “produce identification” to
acknowledging the suspect must “identify himself.” See id. Thus, despite the U.S. Supreme
Court’s assertion that the Nevada statute did not “require a suspect to give the officer a driver’s
license or any other document,” Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004), the
Nevada Supreme Court was, at a minimum, ambiguous in describing the form of a lawful response.
See Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1206.
166. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 197 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See supra note 77 (providing several
Supreme Court decisions that hold that an individual does not have to answer a police officer’s
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statute and the line of cases seeking to construe it introduce ambiguity
and confusion for an ordinary citizen confronted with an identification
request from a law enforcement officer.167 Citizens will be unsure as to
what constitutes a lawful response,168 with the police officer making the
final determination.169 Giving police officers autonomy to make these
determinations certainly increases their discretion, thereby increasing the
chances of arbitrary enforcement of the statute with the result being an
questions). Justice Breyer traced the history of compelling identification in the context of a Terry
stop. Hiibel, 542 U.S. 197 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In announcing the Terry standard, Justice White
concurred in the judgment, but cautioned that further conditions were necessary. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (stating “[o]f course, the person stopped is not obliged
to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest,
although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation”). Justice Breyer continued
by discussing the Court’s decision in Brown v. Texas. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 197 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). In an appendix to the opinion of the Court, the Court made special note of the trial
court’s concern regarding the state’s interest in compelling identification. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 54 (1979) (noting the trial court asked, “I’m sure [officers conducting a Terry stop] should ask
everything they possibly could find out. What I’m asking is what’s the State’s interest in putting a
man in jail because he doesn’t want to answer . . . .”). Justice Breyer made special reference to a
Court majority statement in Berkemer v. McCarty, where the Court noted there was no obligation to
respond to police questioning at a traffic stop Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 198 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)). Justice Breyer concluded:
This lengthy history—of concurring opinions, of references, and of clear explicit
statements—means that the Court’s statement in Berkemer, while technically dicta, is the
kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes as a statement of the law.
And that law has remained undisturbed for more than 20 years.
Id.
167. Brief of Amicus Curiae Privacyactivism et al. at 15, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (No. 03-5554).
Today, many citizens equate identification with “a credential such as a driver’s license, ID card, or
passport, rather than just a verbal act.” Id. Indeed, the police officer in this case made a request, not
for Hiibel to identify himself, but a request to see his identification. Videotape: Hiibel Arrest,
http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/video.html (last visited March 21, 2005). This present-sense
impression is contrary to the construction of the Nevada statute offered by the United States
Supreme Court. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 184-85 (majority opinion). The enforcement of the statute was
different than that stated by the Court, as the deputy went further than merely requesting a name.
Id. at 185. These differing ideas surely will not help to reduce confusion at a traffic stop. See Brief
of Amicus Curiae Privacyactivism et al. at 16, Hiibel (No. 03-5554).
168. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Privacyactivism et al. at 16, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (No. 035554). “[T]he concept of identity is itself vague.” Id. The amicus brief raises the question of what
would be an acceptable response to a request for identity. Id. There are numerous possible
responses to such a question. Id. A person could respond with only a first name, a nickname,
initials, perhaps even a single name, if appropriate for the culture. Id. at 16-17.
169. Id. at 17. The police officer’s satisfaction, or lack thereof, may eventually lead to other
concerns. Id. The suspect may have to respond to further inquiries about identity, or provide proof
of the identity the individual already gave to the officer. Id. The suspect’s response may also lead
to additional intrusions at the discretion of the officer. Id. Justice Breyer noted these same
concerns, observing a question about one’s identity could logically continue into further
questioning. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 198 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asking, “Can a State, in addition to
requiring a stopped individual to answer ‘What’s your name?’ also require an answer to ‘What’s
your license number?’ or ‘Where do you live?’”).
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arrest.170 In summary, the Nevada statute “does not explain how a
pedestrian shall effect this identification, nor does it enumerate
identification methods that are unacceptable, nor does it provide a
procedure to follow should an officer be dissatisfied with an
identification attempt.”171
B. The Nevada Statute Violates the Probable Cause Requirement for
Arrests
The Supreme Court unanimously held, “A direction by a legislature
to the police to arrest all ‘suspicious’ persons would not pass
constitutional muster. A vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak
for a conviction which could not be obtained on the real but undisclosed
grounds for the arrest.”172
1. Construction of the Probable Cause Requirement
Allowing an arrest for a failure to identify oneself, where the
identification request is made without probable cause to believe that the
suspect committed a crime, is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.173
170. Tracy Maclin, What Can the Fourth Amendment Learn from Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 398, 415 (2001) (observing that “controlling police discretion is an important
feature of the vagueness doctrine”). The law should not curtail individuals’ freedom to engage in
lawful activities by subjecting them to the personal ideals of a police officer, detaining them or not
“only at the whim of any police officer.” Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90
(1965) (reasoning a Birmingham ordinance is too vague because of the danger of arbitrary police
enforcement). While discussing the stopping of an individual, Professor LaFave noted several court
decisions “have conferred upon the police virtual carte blanche to stop people because of the color
of their skin or for any other arbitrary reason.” 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.4 (3d
Ed. 1996) (expressing concern over recent court decisions and their effect on arbitrary police
enforcement). In the context of loitering laws, discretion afforded to law enforcement officials
“lends itself to abuse.” Berns, supra note 21, at 718.
171. Brief of Amicus Curiae Privacyactivism et al. at 20, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (No. 03-5554).
172. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169-70 (1972) (holding a vagrancy statute to
be unconstitutionally vague). How is the statement of a court applicable to facts of a case? Was it
the facts that were similar? The statement by the Court in Papachristou seems similar to the facts in
the Hiibel case. Hiibel 542 U.S. at 180-82. The police officer stopped Dudley Hiibel on a report of
a domestic battery. Id. at 180. The officer did not get to the point of investigating the battery,
instead arresting Dudley on an obstruction charge. NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2004). With the
evidence arguably insufficient to support the domestic battery charge, see County of Humboldt v.
Hiibel, No. XX-69056 (J. Ct. of Union Twp., Nev., Feb. 21, 2001) (motion to dismiss), the only
remaining grounds for avoiding a possible false arrest charge would be for a failure to identify and
the corresponding obstruction charge, for which the prosecution obtained a conviction. Hiibel, 542
U.S. at 182.
173. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 n.10 (1983). Edward Lawson raised this
argument to the Supreme Court. Id. However, the Supreme Court did not address the issue because
it found the California statute unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Id. at 361.
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The Fourth Amendment recognizes “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause. . . .”174 The arrest of Dudley Hiibel is
undoubtedly a seizure, thus affording him the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.175
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment to require that law enforcement officers should
make arrests based on probable cause176 and under the authority of a
warrant.177 To provide police officers with some tools in crime
174. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). By construing the language of the Fourth
Amendment, one can conclude the Framers of the Constitution sought to limit the circumstances
under which an individual could be arrested. Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure:
The Concepts of “Stop” and “Arrest.”, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1982) (discussing the limitations the
Framers wished to place on the ability to take a citizen into custody).
175. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968); Robert R. Rigg, The Objective Mind and
“Search Incident to Citation”, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 281, 290 (1999) (observing “the process of
being arrested involves the greatest intrusion into a citizen’s privacy in the continuum of
invasiveness”). Any time there is an arrest, there is a seizure of the person. See Terry, 392 U.S. at
10. “[A] person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his
freedom of movement is restrained.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980).
176. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). Probable cause equates to
some amount of belief more than mere suspicion. Id. The amount of evidence necessary to
constitute probable cause is that which would “‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’
that a felony has been committed.” Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
The Court ultimately expanded on this definition, stating “‘probable cause’ to justify an arrest
means facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in circumstances shown, that the suspect
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S.
31, 37 (1979) (citations omitted).
177. See Jeffrey Haningan Kuras et al., Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 90 GEO. L.J. 1130, 1130 (2002) (discussing the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment). See also Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized
Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 48889 (1995) (analyzing the historical abuses that the Fourth Amendment was enacted to prevent);
Nathan Vaughan, Note, Overgeneralization of the Hot Pursuit Doctrine Provides Another Blow to
the Fourth Amendment in Middletown v. Flinchum, 37 AKRON L. REV. 509, 512-14 (2004)
(discussing the history of the warrant requirement). The Supreme Court stated:
The arrest warrant procedure serves to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a
judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight
and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable
cause. To hold that an officer may act in his own, unchecked discretion upon information
too vague and from too untested a source to permit a judicial officer to accept it as
probable cause for an arrest warrant, would subvert this fundamental policy.
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 481-82. While discussing searches, the Court recognized those made outside
of the warrant process are “per se unreasonable,” subject only to some limited exceptions. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Cf. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 54
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prevention, various exceptions to the warrant requirement emerged.178
However, the Court still requires that in the case of an exception to the
warrant requirement as in the Hiibel case a warrantless arrest,179
probable cause must be present before it is “reasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment.180 The Court recognized the potential problem,
stating, “We allow our police to make arrests only on ‘probable cause’.
. . . Arresting a person on suspicion, like arresting a person for
investigation, is foreign to our system.”181
2. The Text of the Nevada “Stop and Identify” Statute
The text of Section 171.123 of the Nevada Revised Statutes
provides a solution to the constitutional problem implicated by an arrest
for violating identification requirements in “stop and identify”
statutes.182 Section 171.123 only grants a police officer the authority to
(1991). The Court established the ability to arrest a suspect without a properly-secured warrant.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 402 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975). However, the Court emphasized in the case of a
warrantless arrest police must take the suspect before a magistrate for a probable cause
determination. Id. at 114. The Court held “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination
of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Id.
178. Kuras, supra note 177, at 1130.
There are . . . many exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements,
including investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest,
seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, consent searches, vehicle searches,
container searches, inventory searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative
searches, and searches in which the special needs of law enforcement make the probable
cause and warrant requirements impracticable.
Id. One of the most well known exceptions is one applicable to the Hiibel case, the “stop and frisk”
doctrine, delineated in Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-27. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text
(discussing the Terry case). Though a probable cause determination by a magistrate prior to each
arrest would be ideal, the handicap to law enforcement would be too great. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
113. Thus, the Court “has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because
the officers failed to secure a warrant.” Id.
179. See Kuras, supra note 177, at 1144-47.
180. William D. Anderson, Jr., Investigation and Police Practices: Overview of the Fourth
Amendment, 82 GEO. L.J. 597, 597 (1994) (providing an overview of searches and seizures
governed by the Fourth Amendment). Once a law enforcement officer does not act under the
Warrant Clause, the Fourth Amendment requires searches and seizures be “reasonable.” See U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. In this situation, the Court required that the seizure be based upon probable
cause. Carroll v US, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925). Even with the Terry case creating an exception
to the probable cause requirement by allowing a “stop” based on reasonable suspicion, the Supreme
Court has been careful to limit its application. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979).
See also DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 44 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing law enforcement authority
to detain suspects on the basis of reasonable suspicion is “narrowly drawn”) (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 27).
181. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).
182. See supra note 106 (stating the text of the Nevada “stop and identify” statute). A logical
place to begin any legal analysis is with the text of statute. See Wilson R. Huhn, Teaching Legal
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detain individuals who fail to offer identification in response to an
officer’s request.183 The Nevada statutes contemplate a progression
from reasonable suspicion under Section 171.123 to arrest under Section
171.1231 “if probable cause for an arrest appears.”184 This process
appears to be analogous to the one that the Supreme Court proffered in
Terry.185 The Nevada prosecutor’s office surely must have gleaned as
much from the text of the statute, as it eventually charged Dudley Hiibel
not for a failure to identify himself, but for delaying an officer.186
Analysis Using a Pluralistic Model of Law, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 433, 440-42 (2001) (discussing the
applicability of textual analysis in solving legal problems).
183. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004). The first two words of the statute are “temporary
detention.” Id. By failing to identify himself, Subsection 3 became directly applicable to Hiibel.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2004). Under this provision, the police officer “may detain” the
suspect, but “only to ascertain his identity.” Id. This section of the code is simply void of any
allowance of arrest for a failure to identify oneself. See id. The Court in Hiibel references
numerous state “stop and identify” statutes. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 182-83
(2004). Of these, several agree with the Nevada legislature and allow only for a brief detention.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (2005) (stipulating that an officer “may stop” an individual); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-103(1) (West 2003) (stating that a “stopping shall not constitute an
arrest”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902(b) (2003) (allowing a suspect “who fails to give
identification. . . [to] be detained and further questioned and investigated); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/107-14 (2003) (referring to temporary questioning without arrest); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1)
(2004) (providing the officer’s actions occur “without making an arrest”). But see DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 1321(6) (2003) (incorporating an identification requirement into a loitering statute); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 856.021(2) (West 2002) (considering the failure to present identification and
“dispel[ling] alarm” are part of a process prior to arrest); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36(b) (2005)
(stating the failure to present identification is a factor which a police officer can consider for a
loitering offense, a misdemeanor). The Supreme Court commented on the brief nature of traffic
stops:
State laws governing when a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop may or must be
issued a citation instead of taken into custody vary significantly . . . but no State requires
that a detained motorist be arrested unless he is accused of a specified serious crime,
refuses to promise to appear in court, or demands to be taken before a magistrate.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 n.26 (1984).
184. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.1231 (2004). The heading of this section is even more
informative, providing for “[a]rrest if probable cause appears.” Id. The full text of the statute reads,
“At any time after the onset of the detention pursuant to NRS 171.123, the person so detained shall
be arrested if probable cause for an arrest appears. If, after inquiry into the circumstances which
prompted the detention, no probable cause for arrest appears, such person shall be released.” Id.
185. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968). The majority in Terry discussed a set of “flexible
responses,” allowing the police officer to alter his actions based upon the facts and circumstances
available. Id. The Court takes care to note the distinction between a “stop” based upon reasonable
suspicion, and an “arrest.” Id. The majority stated, “If the ‘stop’ and the ‘frisk’ give rise to
probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, then the police should be
empowered to make a formal ‘arrest,’ and a full incident ‘search’ of the person.” Id. (emphasis
added).
186. County of Humboldt v. Hiibel, No. XX-69056, slip op. at 2 (J. Ct. of Union Twp., Nev.,
Feb. 21, 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2004). The domestic battery charge was later
dismissed. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 (motion to dismiss). It is certainly possible that Hiibel was not
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3. Application to the Facts at Issue
Hiibel did not contest the presence of reasonable suspicion in this
case.187 With a lawful basis for a detention, the officer, Deputy Dove,
was well within his rights to conduct an investigation.188 All that was
necessary for an arrest was probable cause.189 Dove lacked probable
cause in this case, as he completed little investigation prior to arresting
Hiibel.190 With no real investigation performed prior to arrest, there
could be no graduation to probable cause concerning any actual basis for
the traffic stop,191 resulting in a violation of Hiibel’s Fourth Amendment
rights.192 By refusing to identify himself, Hiibel merely asserted his
charged under the Nevada “stop and identify” statute because it does not contain an arrest provision.
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004). Even after discussing the identification requirement, the
Justice Court still found it necessary to convict Hiibel on the obstruction charge. Hiibel, No. XX69056, at 2-3.
187. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201 (Nev.
2002) (No. 38876). Indeed, Hiibel conceded there was articulable suspicion that both a battery had
taken place as well as a possible offense for driving under the influence. Id. Hiibel agreed the
officer was entitled to conduct an investigation. Id. The reasonable suspicion spawned from an
anonymous tip phoned into the sheriff’s department. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 180. With reasonable
suspicion being a much less demanding standard than probable cause, the Supreme Court held an
anonymous tip served as a basis of reasonable suspicion. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 33031 (1990) (analyzing whether a sufficiently corroborated tip can suffice to form reasonable
suspicion). Once the tip is corroborated, as Deputy Dove did in the present case, the Court held the
officer has reasonable suspicion with which to conduct an investigation. Id. at 331.
188. See, e.g., Terrence C. Gill, Note, Regulating the Police in Investigatory Stops: A Practical
Alternative to Bright Line Rules, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 185-86 (1985) (analyzing a police
officer’s conduct after a lawful Terry stop); Saltzburg, supra note 67, at 952 (stating “[a] Terry stop
enables the police to ascertain whether what looks like criminal activity, actually is”). Cf. Terry,
392 U.S. at 24 (discussing an officer’s ability to conduct a protective search in the presence of a
reasonable belief that the suspect has a weapon). The ability to investigate suspicious conduct is
certainly in line with a police officer’s beliefs as to his or her authority. James J. Fyfe, Terry “On
The Job”: Terry: An Ex-Cop’s View, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1998) (analyzing the Terry
decision from the perspective of a former New York City police officer). See also John F. Wagner,
Jr., Annotation, Law Enforcement Officer’s Authority, Under Federal Constitution’s Fourth
Amendment, To Stop and Briefly Detain, and To Conduct Limited Protective Search Of or “Frisk,”
For Investigative Purposes, Persons Suspected of Criminal Activity – Supreme Court Cases, 104 L.
ED. 2D 1046 (2005).
189. See supra notes 172-85 and accompanying text (adhering to the view that probable cause
is necessary for an arrest subsequent to a traffic stop under both Supreme Court precedent and the
Nevada “stop and identify” statute at issue in this case).
190. Videotape: Hiibel Arrest, (http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/video.html (last visited
March 21, 2005). Deputy Dove referenced the battery or “fight” only once before trying to obtain
identification from Hiibel. Id.
191. With the lack of investigation performed at the point of arrest, taking Hiibel into custody
for delaying an officer seems questionable. NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2004). Justice Stevens
remarked that given the majority’s view of the facts, Hiibel’s “refusal to cooperate did not impede
the police investigation.” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; supra notes 172-85. The Ninth Circuit described the
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privileges and rights as others had done in similar situations.193 While
analyzing a “stop and identify” statute under the vagueness doctrine, the
Michigan Court of Appeals authored a poignant statement on exceeding
the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment by allowing activities on less
than probable cause:
[T]he ordinance undercuts the probable cause standard of the Fourth
Amendment. A police officer may make only a limited search of a
person he has stopped on suspicion, and then only if he has reason to
believe the person is armed and dangerous. The Detroit ordinance
sanctions full searches on suspicion, without regard for dangerousness,
of those persons whose activities fall within the vague parameters of
the ordinance.
. . . [T]he ordinance is void, the search incident to arrest for violation
of the ordinance was unlawful.194

C. An Identification Requirement Infringes Upon Fifth Amendment
Rights
The Supreme Court has definitively recognized the Fifth

situation involved with the Nevada statutes. Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 880
(9th Cir. 2002). Carey was charged with obstructing a police officer, NEV. REV. STAT. § 197.190
(2004), after he violated the Nevada “stop and identify” statute. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004).
The court discussed bootstrapping the authority to arrest on less than probable cause. Carey, 279
F.3d at 880. The agent in Carey was able to make an arrest even though he had no probable cause
to believe any of the laws at issue had been violated. Id. The court concluded this circumstance
was “unreasonable.” Id. at 881.
193. See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 541 (1967); Miller v. United States, 230
F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1956); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff’d
339 U.S. 1 (1950). Mr. See refused to allow city fire officials to enter his warehouse without a
warrant and without probable cause. See, 387 U.S. at 541. His conviction was reversed. Id. at 546.
Miller was charged with obstruction after refusing to allow a United States Marshal to enter her
home without a search warrant. Miller, 230 F.2d at 487. Her conviction was also reversed. Id. at
490. Little was prosecuted for hindering a health official in performing his duty when she refused
to allow him to enter her home without a warrant. Little, 178 F.2d at 14. A lower court reversed her
conviction, and that decision was affirmed. Id. at 21. The Supreme Court overturned convictions
based on seizures or other intrusive detentions performed by police officers on reasonable suspicion
alone. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (stating only “when the nature
and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests,
the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than probable cause”);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 496 (1983) (taking Royer into a room for interrogation was too
intrusive, and could only be performed on the basis of probable cause); People v. DeFillippo, 80
Mich. App. 197, 202 (1977) (reversing defendant’s conviction based upon the impermissible scope
of a search), rev’d on other grounds, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
194. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. at 202-03.
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Amendment right to remain silent.195 Defendants, suspects, witnesses,
and others have asserted this right in a variety of contexts.196 Given the
breadth of the right to remain silent and the fact that numerous Supreme
Court justices have argued that citizens should not be compelled to
answer a police officer’s questions,197 it comes as no surprise that Hiibel
chose to withhold his identity.198 However, the Fifth Amendment
privileges only apply to those compelled statements which are both
195. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (recognizing a right to remain silent in a custodial
situation is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment). Cf. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,
197 (2002) (reviewing the case as an analysis of a citizen’s right not to cooperate); Michael R.
Patrick, Note, Toward the Constitutional Protection of a Non-Testifying Defendant’s Prearrest
Silence, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 897, 930 (1997) (noting the privilege against self-incrimination applies
before an official arrest). The right to remain silent is derived from the Fifth Amendment’s
provision that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Concerning the right to remain silent, Justice Robert Jackson
once stated, “[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell suspects in no uncertain terms to make no
statement to police under any circumstances.” Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (observing privileges guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment are available in all settings where coercion may force self-incrimination);
Michael Avery, Confronting Issues in Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement and Criminal Offenders:
You Have a Right to Remain Silent, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 575 (2003) (noting that privilege
against self-incrimination is available outside criminal proceedings). In any criminal trial, the
defendant has the right to refuse to testify. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299-300 (1981).
The target of a grand jury investigation enjoys this same right. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760, 767-68 (2003). Finally, Miranda itself dealt with an arrested suspect enjoying this right even
though he was merely the subject of custodial interrogation at the police station. Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 467. Indeed, the Supreme Court said of the Fifth Amendment privilege:
The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a
witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer
official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or
informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). This casenote does not endeavor to raise the argument
that Miranda warnings apply to traffic or Terry stops. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440
(1984) (stating, “The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the
absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda”);
Richard A. Williamson, The Virtues (And Limits) of Shared Values: The Fourth Amendment and
Miranda’s Concept of Custody, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (1993) (noting the Court’s
decision in Berkemer held Miranda warnings inapplicable in the context of a traffic stop); Note,
supra note 19, at 667-68 (noting the Fourth Amendment provides safeguards for a Terry stop,
whereas the Court intended Miranda to protect individuals subject to a custodial interrogation).
197. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s statements
surrounding compelling an individual to answer a police officer’s questions). Furthermore, the
Court also stated, “We have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not
furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.” Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). Justice Breyer viewed this long line of cases as establishing a
right to refuse to answer questions, a principle to which Hiibel adhered. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct.
of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 197-99 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer regarded this “strong
dicta . . . as a statement of the law.” Id. at 198.
198. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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testimonial and incriminating in nature.199
1. Testimonial Communication
In examining the testimonial communication element, the Supreme
Court observed, “In order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information. Only then is a person compelled to be a ‘witness’ against
himself.”200 Any response by Hiibel to an identification request would
clearly relay a factual assertion.201 Traditionally, the Court has viewed
such verbal acts as meeting this testimonial requirement.202 Thus,
Justice Stevens correctly asserted that identifying oneself under the
circumstances of this case would be a testimonial communication.203
199. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 207 (1988) (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 409 (1976)). See also Williamson, supra note 196, at 388. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment
in no way inhibits law enforcement officials from asking questions. United States v. Monia, 317
U.S. 424, 433 (1943).
200. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (quoting Doe, 487 U.S. at 210). See
also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000). The majority in Hiibel did not address
whether identifying oneself in the context of a traffic stop would be testimonial. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at
189 (stating that though the State of Nevada urged the Court to hold an identification requirement is
nontestimonial, “[w]e decline to resolve the case on that basis”). However, the Court does go on to
recognize, “Stating one’s name may qualify as an assertion of fact relating to identity. Production of
identity documents might meet the definition as well.” Id.
201. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 589. Disclosing one’s identity does not fall within an exception to the
testimonial element, such as the disclosure of real or physical evidence. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). The Court has found certain acts and the production of physical evidence
are not testimonial, falling outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment. E.g., United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (ruling a voice recording was not testimonial); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967) (holding taking handwriting exemplars did not violate the protections of
the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967) (stating a requirement that
an individual participate in a lineup is not a testimonial act); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 (holding
the act of providing a blood sample was not testimonial or communicative); Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (ruling having a prisoner wear a particular piece of clothing was
admissible under the Fifth Amendment).
202. Doe, 487 U.S. at 213-14 (stating expressly, “There are very few instances in which a
verbal statement, either oral or written, will not convey information or assert facts. The vast
majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial and, to that extent at least, will fall within the
privilege.”). See also Patrick, supra note 195, at 931. In Muniz, the Court discussed the distinction
between the production of physical evidence and a verbal response to a question. Muniz, 496 U.S.
at 593. The Court noted providing a blood sample, thereby disclosing physical evidence, was nontestimonial. Id. However, the Court contrasted this to a verbal act, stating “had the police instead
asked the suspect directly whether his blood contained a high concentration of alcohol, his
affirmative response would have been testimonial even though it would have been used to draw the
same inference concerning his physiology.” Id.
203. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Charles Gardner Geyh,
The Testimonial Component of the Right Against Self-Incrimination, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 611, 62841 (1987) (discussing inconsistencies with Supreme Court decisions on the testimonial component
and offering a more precise definition). The majority also seemed to agree with Justice Stevens, as
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2. The Nevada Statute Imposes the Danger of Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination extends
not only to statements that in and of themselves are incriminating, but
also to those which by association lead to the discovery of incriminating
evidence.204 The majority in Hiibel chose to resolve the Fifth
Amendment challenge on the ground that disclosing a person’s name is
not incriminating.205
The majority appears too ready to disregard all possibilities that
disclosing his name would incriminate Hiibel.206 One commentator
noted that “[i]t is not necessary, in order to assert the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, that the testimony will, with
certainty, lead to criminal conviction of the witness . . .”207 This
scenario, a criminal conviction or at the least detention, was possible for
Hiibel under Nevada law by the mere disclosure of his name.208 Indeed,
Justice Kennedy wrote, “Stating one’s name may qualify as an assertion of fact relating to identity.
Production of identity documents might meet the definition as well.” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189.
204. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 20 (2001) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,
486 (1951)); 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1138 (West 2005) (defining what statements are
incriminating). The Fifth Amendment guards against those “disclosures that the witness reasonably
believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so
used.” Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972). In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S.
362 (1917), Chief Justice John Marshall stated:
When a question is propounded, it belongs to the court to consider and to decide whether
any direct answer to it can implicate the witness. If this be decided in the negative, then
he may answer it without violating the privilege which is secured to him by law. If a
direct answer to it may incriminate himself, then he must be the sole judge what his
answer would be.
Id. at 364-65 (citations omitted).
205. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189. The Court maintains the police officer in this case could not have
used Hiibel’s name in any way to incriminate Hiibel. See id. at 190. However, while making the
conclusion that a name is not incriminating, the majority takes care to note “a case may arise where
there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the
police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual . . .” Id. at 191.
206. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). In Innis, the Court noted the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not “distinguish degrees of incrimination.” Id.
at 301 n.5.
207. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 91 (West 2005).
208. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2004). The police officer was investigating a report of an
assault. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 180. The assault involved Hiibel and his daughter. Hiibel’s home page,
Facts page, http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/facts.html (last visited March 21, 2005). Thus,
through simple police work upon discovering everyone’s identity, the officer would have discovered
the two involved in the assault were related. Id. As a result, Hiibel could have been subjected to a
charge of domestic violence. NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018(1)(b) (providing that a person is guilty of
domestic violence when he commits an assault upon any person to whom he is related by blood).
Once the officer established that a domestic battery occurred, an arrest would be required under
Nevada law. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137(1) (2004). Two examples are illustrative of the potential
implications stemming from an identification requirement. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684
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a person’s name provides access to a wide range of information which
may be used to his detriment.209 Individuals similarly situated to Hiibel
have a plethora of different rationales for refusing to respond to police
officers’ inquiries.210
(1972); United States v. Purry, 545 F.2d 217, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Kirby, the police officers
requested identification from the suspect at a Terry stop, and he subsequently produced the
identification of a robbery victim. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 684. An identification requirement thus,
ultimately, led to the suspect’s arrest. Id. A similar situation happened in Purry, where an
identification request ultimately led to the connection of the suspect with an armed robbery. Purry,
545 F.2d at 219.
209. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. at 3, Hiibel, 542 U.S.
177 (No. 03-5554). Databases and systems accessible by police include the National Crime
Information Center (“NCIC”), the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (“MATRIX”),
the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology System (“US-VISIT”), the
Driver and Vehicle Information Database (“DAVID”), and the Transportation Workers
Identification Credential (“TWIC”). Id. The amicus brief goes on to state:
Police officers today have access to an extraordinary range of detailed personal
information in government databases that could easily give rise to further investigations
unrelated to the reasons for the initial detention. Moreover, much of the information
contained in these databases is often inaccurate and unreliable. Some of the information
is obtained from private record systems and was never intended to be used for law
enforcement purposes.
Id. at 5. Justice Stevens asks the question, if a name is not incriminating or useful to a police officer
in the course of an investigation, “why else would an officer ask for it?” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 195-96
(Stevens, J., dissenting). To reiterate, the majority in Hiibel viewed an individual’s name or identity
as neutral, not incriminating. See id. at 191 (majority opinion). This idea is in accord with a
previous statement from the Court concerning a similar type of statute. See California v. Byers, 402
U.S. 424, 429 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hallock, supra note 17, at 1076 (referencing the Byers
decision as requiring a substantial danger of self-incrimination before Fifth Amendment privileges
would be violated). However, it is possible to distinguish the statute in Byers and the “stop and
identify” statute in Hiibel, in that, the former was mainly regulatory in nature. Hallock, supra note
17, at 1077. Compare CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002 (Deering 1971) and NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123
(2004).
210. See Sara Ciarelli, Comment, Pre-Arrest Silence: Minding That Gap Between Fourth
Amendment Stops and Fifth Amendment Custody, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 651, 673-75
(2003) (reviewing various reasons a person may refuse to respond to a police officer’s questions).
Though analyzing silence from the perspective of using such silence as evidence of guilt, the
reasoning offered for refusing to answer is applicable in the case of a “stop and identify” statute:
A person may refuse to speak to police simply out of fear and intimidation. A person
may refuse to respond to questioning because she may be involved in unrelated
transactions, criminal or non-criminal, that she may not want to reveal to the police. A
suspect may refuse to respond to questioning because an accomplice or other third-party
has intimidated him with threats if he talks to the police. A suspect may refuse to
respond in order to protect a friend or family member. Furthermore, the right to silence
is a right upon which many would rely; because of the repetition of ‘you have the right to
remain silent’ in the media, silence may appear to provide the only safe harbor from
criminal prosecution and conviction.
Thus, the reasons for silence are varied and many of these reasons have nothing to do
with guilt associated with committing the specific crime. Nevertheless, a person accused
of a crime may invoke her Fifth Amendment rights through silence because she is in an
intimidating situation - a police officer may pat down her body searching for weapons, or
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D. Individual and Governmental Interests Involved in the Hiibel
Decision
The final method for analyzing the Hiibel decision is to examine
the reasonableness of the intrusion to the individual, a rationale the
Supreme Court first proposed in the Terry case.211 The Court wrote in
Terry that there is a “central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment—the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”212 This inquiry should consist
of balancing an individual’s interests against the governmental interests
furthered by an identification requirement.213
1. Individual Interests
Hiibel argued that his First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment liberty
interests were at stake.214 At least one Justice characterized the
individual’s interests involved in compelled identification as
“safeguarding individual freedom and privacy from arbitrary
governmental interference.”215 Hiibel certainly has a privacy interest

badger her with questions in a setting that is removed from the public.
Id. at 673-74 (citations omitted). Commentaries on the use of pre-arrest silence against the accused
at a subsequent trial are helpful in understanding the depth to which the Court has protected against
the use of silence as evidence of guilt. See generally Jane Elinor Notz, Comment, Prearrest Silence
as Evidence of Guilt: What You Don’t Say Shouldn’t Be Used Against You, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009,
1011 (1997) (arguing that pre-arrest silence is not admissible as evidence of guilt). But see Barbara
Rook Snyder, A Due Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of Silence in Criminal Trials, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 285, 297-301 (1988) (maintaining the position that in certain situations the
use of pre-arrest silence should be admissible as probative of a suspect’s guilt).
211. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
212. Id. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (observing one purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (holding a fundamental inquiry in Fourth Amendment analysis is whether the
seizure is reasonable).
213. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (stating the reasonableness of a Fourth
Amendment seizure is determined by a “balancing of the competing interests”); County of Riverside
v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53 (1991) (noting the Court established a balance between individuals
interests and those of law enforcement). See Jason M. Katz, Note, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista:
Buckle-Up or Get Locked-Up: Warrantless Arrests for Fine-Only Misdemeanors Under the Fourth
Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 491, 525-27 (2003) (describing how the Court should have
proceeded in Atwater to a balancing of the interests involved).
214. Brief for the Petitioner at 33, 2003 WL 23144815, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (No. 03-5554).
Hiibel argued his interests in security, privacy, and mobility outweighed any possible governmental
interests involved. Id.
215. Hallock, supra note 17, at 1070 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring)). Without the ability to refuse to answer an officer’s request for
identification, an individual has no means of safeguarding personal privacy and security rights. Id.
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that the police officer encroached upon,216 and that interest can easily
justify withholding his name.217 Furthermore, with the ability to arrest a
person for a refusal to identify himself, the police officers have a
legitimate ability to impinge upon one’s right of locomotion, or the
freedom to move or travel.218 The Court in Kolender discussed this very
issue, observing that the compelled identification scheme in that case
implicated the right of locomotion.219 Finally, the Court has dealt with
the effect of an identification requirement on other First Amendment
rights, though in a different context.220
The “stop and identify” statute gives too much authority to police
216. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (stating “[t]he overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted State
intrusion). The Court in Terry stated:
Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a
policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised,
is a “petty indignity.” It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17. A privacy interest exists when an individual has a subjective interest of
privacy which society objectively deems is reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, the adverse
government activity fulfills the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988) (holding there was no expectation of privacy in
one’s garbage at the curb, and the subsequent search was constitutional).
217. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No. 03-5554). Hiibel
argued he had a privacy interest in his name. Id. Hiibel firmly held the belief that he had a privacy
interest in his name, evidenced by the fact that he repeatedly refused to disclose it. Hiibel, 542 U.S.
at 181. Additionally, society would likely recognize a privacy interest in a person’s name, as most
people will not readily disclose their names to strangers. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 10, Hiibel,
542 U.S. 177 (No. 03-5554). Additionally, most individuals keep their names secret given the wide
range of databases available to a police officer. See supra note 209 and accompanying text
(examining the databases police officers can access with an individual’s name).
218. E.g. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (stating the “freedom to travel
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution”);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (recognizing that all individuals should be free to
travel), overruled in part on other grounds, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See generally
Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1264-83 (1990) (providing an in-depth analysis of the right of locomotion).
In discussing the right of locomotion, Professor Maclin argues “substantial discretion given to
police officers in their confrontations with citizens has severely restricted that right.” Id. at 1260.
219. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (stating the statute “implicates consideration of the
constitutional right to freedom of movement”).
220. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). In Talley, a Los Angeles city ordinance did
not allow the distribution of pamphlets omitting the author’s and manufacturer’s names. Id. at 6061. Talley distributed pamphlets calling for the boycott of certain merchants, and the police arrested
him. Id. at 61. In ruling the ordinance was facially invalid, the Court stated “an identification
requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of
expression.” Id. at 64. The Court further remarked, “[T]here are times and circumstances when
States may not compel members of groups engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly
identified.” Id. at 65.
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officers who are all too ready to investigate.221 The effect of this is a
constraint on the rights of innocent citizens.222 The result is even more
burdensome if the individual involved is a member of a minority
group.223
2. Governmental Interests
The Nevada courts delineated various governmental interests
furthered by an identification requirement, including crime prevention,
crime detection, police officer safety, public safety, and even
terrorism.224 These principles are important and deserve protection by
the courts.225 However, the Nevada statute does not protect and advance
221. See Fyfe, supra note 17, at 470. Professor Fyfe even comments about those police
officers becoming less trusting in dealing with individuals, which could lead to more suspicion and
then arrests under the auspices of a “stop and identify” statute. See id. More certainly, these laws
make the jobs of police officers much easier. Id. at 471.
222. See Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161,
1161-72 (1966) (discussing the effect of police confrontations on the life of an individual engaged
in no wrongdoing); Timothy P. O’Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the
Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 693, 693
(1998) (noting traffic laws provide the opportunity for police to stop individuals for numerous
minor violations). Police stopped a Yale law professor on numerous occasions while walking, in
Maryland, California, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York. Reich, supra, at 1161. Police
officers also detained him without reason several times while he was driving. Id. at 1161-62.
Dealing with laws very similar to “stop and identify” statutes, the professor expressed concern over
the “virtually unlimited sanction [which] lurks behind the policeman’s questions.” Id. at 1166.
223. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 354. Lawson, a black man, was stopped fifteen times over a
two year period. Fyfe, supra note 17, at 472. Lawson was only prosecuted twice, and convicted
once. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 354. The Supreme Court upheld a vagueness challenge to the
California statute. Fyfe, supra note 17, at 472. With a statute similar to the one in Hiibel, stops
involving minorities like Edward Lawson could turn into arrests. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of
Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004) (affirming the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court). Also, the
police are more likely to stop minorities, such as African-Americans. Reich, supra note 222, at
1164. This situation becomes even more disconcerting when one takes into account the Supreme
Court’s holding that police officer’s subjective reasons for performing a Terry stop are irrelevant in
the context of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).
224. County of Humboldt v. Hiibel, No. XX-69056, slip op. at 2 (J. Ct. of Union Twp., Nev.,
Feb. 21, 2001); Hiibel v. State, No. CR 01-4463, slip op. at 8 (6th Jud. Dist. Ct., Nev., June 25,
2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1205-06 (Nev. 2002), aff’d, 542 U.S. 177
(2004). The Justice Court of Union Township based its decision on both crime prevention and
crime detection. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 2. The Nevada District Court examined the interests of
officers and public safety. Hiibel, No. CR 01-4463, at 8. The Nevada Supreme Court did the most
extensive analysis of governmental interests, recognizing the importance of officer safety, crime
prevention and terrorism. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1205-06.
225. E.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698 (1981) (recognizing public interests of
crime prevention, crime detection, and officer safety can make a seizure reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (observing crime prevention is an
important social interest); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (weighing the
importance of public safety and crime prevention); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (noting a
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these interests, especially in a situation with an innocent, unarmed
person like Hiibel which is a probable occurrence.226 Without any real
basis for suspecting misconduct on the part of an individual, the
balancing of interests involved should favor protection of the
individual’s rights and privileges.227
E. Recent Legislative Developments
The Arizona legislature recently enacted a “stop and identify”
statute that the governor signed into law.228 The new Arizona statute is
different from the Nevada law applied in Hiibel in several respects.229
First, the Arizona ordinance calls for a law enforcement officer to
provide notice that a failure to give one’s name is a crime, thus resolving
anyone’s preconceived notion about being able to withhold this
information during a Terry stop.230 Additionally, the Arizona law deals
general interest in crime prevention and detection). The Nevada Supreme Court considered the
public interests involved to be “overwhelming.” Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1205.
226. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004). With the crime already completed, the interests
in crime prevention are lower. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985).
Additionally, Terry already provides the ability to perform a patdown search in the interests of
police officer safety. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. It is uncertain how asking the individual’s name would
increase safety beyond that of a patdown search, which is already considered a “significant
intrusion” upon an individual’s rights. Id. at 24-25. The Court in Terry stressed the importance of
disarming a suspect as a central concern or interest allowing a patdown search with less than
probable cause. Id. at 29. As Hiibel was not armed, the interests of police officers or public safety
are not advanced. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181. Concerning terrorism, the Eleventh Circuit recently
dealt with a large-scale search conducted at least partly due to a Department of Homeland Security
threat assessment. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004). The circuit court
ruled that a search based upon this interest, even if combined with others such as public safety,
violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1316. The court stated, “While the threat of terrorism is
omnipresent, we cannot use it as the basis for restricting the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s
protections . . . .” Id. at 1311.
227. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52. To reiterate, the only charge left against Hiibel was for the failure
to identify himself, a “delaying an officer” violation. Hiibel, No. XX-69056 at 3. The court
dismissed the charge of domestic battery. Id. (motion to dismiss).
228. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2412 (2005). The text of the statute provides:
Refusing To Provide Truthful Name When Lawfully Detained; Violation; Classification
A. It is unlawful for a person, after being advised that the person’s refusal to answer is
unlawful, to fail or refuse to state the person’s true full name on request of a peace
officer who has lawfully detained the person based on reasonable suspicion that the
person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. A person detained
under this section shall state the person’s true full name, but shall not be compelled to
answer any other inquiry of a peace officer.
B. A person who violates this section is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.
Id.
229. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2412 (2005) with NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123
(2004).
230. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2412 (2005). The Arizona law requires a law enforcement
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with problems under the vagueness doctrine by providing both the form
and content of a lawful response.231 However, though the Arizona
statute makes improvements in some areas, it still allows for arrests
based upon a finding of reasonable suspicion alone.232 Finally, the law
fails to address the danger of self-incrimination inherent in any
identification requirement.233
V. CONCLUSION
When discussing a case overturning a “stop and identify” statute,
one commentator wrote, “[T]he official closest to [the case] welcomed
the Court’s decision on the grounds that [the statute] was a ‘stupid’ law
that invited abuse, damaged police relations with minorities and
others . . . and rarely resulted in the detection of offenders.”234 While the
Nevada statute at issue is not a “stupid” law on its face, the Court’s
interpretation allows law enforcement officers to go beyond its
mandates, which may be unwise.235 The Nevada statute also does little
to advance the governmental interests that courts assert that it serves.236
In light of these issues, the Supreme Court has extinguished
constitutional rights by allowing one of the most significant intrusions,
arrest, in the absence of probable cause.237 A viable alternative would be
official to advise that a failure to respond is unlawful. Id. As a result, the officer quickly and
accurately provides the law, dispelling any thoughts that a person has on the lawfulness of
withholding identification. See supra notes 77-79, 195-98, and accompanying text.
231. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2412 (2005). The statute requires only that a suspect
“state [his or her] true full name.” Id. There is little confusion as to what constitutes a lawful
response to a request for identification. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. Further, by
clearly delineating a lawful response, the law also reduces the amount of discretion that normal
“stop and identify” statutes afford to law enforcement officers. See supra note 170 and
accompanying text.
232. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2412 (2005). The Arizona law provides a person who
does not state his or her true full name is guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. By allowing for arrest
without graduation to probable cause, the statute contradicts the mandates of the Fourth
Amendment. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
234. Fyfe, supra note 17, at 474.
235. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (discussing how the Nevada statute only
provides for detention rather than arrest).
236. See supra note 224-27 and accompanying text (analyzing the governmental interests
implicated by a “stop and identify” statute).
237. See supra notes 172-94 and accompanying text (examining the Nevada statute’s impact
on the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement); U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST.
amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V. Furthermore, this authority goes beyond that contemplated by
the Framers, who did not view even probable cause as justifying a warrantless arrest. See Thomas
Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions
and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
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to adhere to the words of the statute and allow police officers to go no
further than a brief detention and investigation for a failure to provide
identification.238
James G. Warner

239, 246-47 (2002) (discussing the Framers intent surrounding probable cause and arrests).
238. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2004).
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